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UNWITTING SANCTIONS: UNDERSTANDING ANTI-
BRIBERY LEGISLATION AS ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST 
EMERGING MARKETS 
Andrew Brady Spalding • 
ABSTRACT 
Although the purpose of international anti-bribery legislation, 
particularly the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), is to deter 
bribery, empirical evidence demonstrates a problematic collateral effect. 
In countries where bribery is perceived to be relatively common, the 
present enforcement regime goes beyond the deterrence of bribery, and 
ultimately deters investment. Drawing on literature from political 
science and economics, this Article argues that anti-bribery legislation, 
as presently enforced, functions as de facto economic sanctions. A 
detailed analysis of the history of FCP A enforcement shows that these 
sanctions most often occur in emerging markets, where historic 
opportunities for economic and social development otherwise exist and 
where public policy should encourage investment. This effect is 
contrary to the FCPA's purpose which, as the legislative history shows, 
is to build economic and political alliances by promoting ethical 
overseas investment. 
These perverse and unanticipated consequences create two policy 
problems. First, the sanctions literature suggests that capital-rich 
countries that are not committed to effectively enforcing anti-bribery 
measures may fill the resulting foreign direct investment void. This 
dynamic creates myriad ethical, economic, and foreign policy problems, 
as observed, for example, in China's aggressive investment in Africa, 
Latin America, and Central Asia. Second, by enforcing these laws 
without regard to their sanctioning effects, developed nations are 
unwittingly sacrificing poverty reduction opportunities to combat 
bribery. This Article concludes with various proposed reforms to the 
text and enforcement of international anti-bribery legislation that would 
further the goal of deterring bribery without deterring investment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Legislation prohibiting the bribery of overseas officials for business 
purposes has rapidly risen from relative obscurity to become among the 
most significant legal issues in international commerce. Although the 
United States passed the first statute of its kind, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), 1 over thirty years ago, a number of economic and 
political factors contributed to an early pattern of only sporadic 
enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).2 Then in the late 1990s 
and the following decade, a number of historical events combined to 
precipitate a dramatic increase in enforcement of anti-bribery 
legislation. 3 Not least of these was the 1997 adoption by the member 
states of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)4 of a convention obligating signatory countries to enact FCP A-
type legislation. 5 The adoption of that convention marked a sea change 
in worldwide attitudes toward bribery and the emergence of an 
international, but not universal, commitment in principle to enforcing 
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(l), (g)-(h), 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff (2006)), 
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 
1107 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff(2006)); International Anti-
Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd(1)-(3), 78ff(2006)). 
2. See Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrnpt Practices Act to Include 
a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 192-95 (1994). 
3. For explanations for the dramatic surge in enforcement, see David C. Weiss, Note, 
The Foreign Corrnpt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving 
International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 471, 484-85 (2009). See also Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: 
Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1447, 1447-49 (2008); Eugene R. Erbstoesser, John 
H. Sture & John W.F. Chesley, The FCPA and Analogous Foreign Anti-Bribery Laws-
Overview, Recent Developments, and Acquisition Due Diligence, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 381, 
386-94 (2007) (discussing briefly the most significant enforcement efforts); Mike Koehler, A 
Malady in Search of a Cure-The Increase in FCPA Enforcement Actions Against Health-Care 
Companies, 38 U. MEM. L. REv. 261, 262, 282 (2008). 
4. Founded in 1961, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
"brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy 
from around the world to: [s]upport sustainable growth; [b]oost employment, raise living 
standards; [m]aintain financial stability; [a]ssist other countries' economic development; [and 
c]ontribute to growth in world trade[.]" See Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_ 
1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
5. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development: Convention on 
Combating Bribery ofF oreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 
1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD 
Convention]. For a catalogue of each member country's implementing legislation, see Weiss, 
supra note 3, at 488-89 n.lOl, 490--91 n.l03. 
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bribery prohibitions.6 No longer at a competitive disadvantage,7 the 
United States resolved to finally give teeth to the FCP A, and the rate of 
enforcement has since accelerated dramatically.8 This trend is likely to 
continue, as the DOJ has described the exponential increase in 
enforcement actions over the last several years as "the tip of the 
iceberg."9 
Although the frequency of anti-bribery law enforcement has risen 
sharply, it has not yet produced a commensurate rise in legal 
scholarship. While scholars over the last thirty years have explored such 
issues as the moral and economic justifications for the legislation, 10 the 
problem of cultural relativism/ 1 the statute's underlying theories of 
6. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The 1998 
OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in 
Business Transactions, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 485, 485-86 (2000); Barbara Crutchfield George, 
Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery 
Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward the 
Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 1, 3, 37 (1999). 
7. For the legislative history reflecting initial concerns about a competitive disadvantage 
and an ultimate determination that the OECD convention would supply the remedy, see infra 
Part IV.A, Part IV.C. 
8. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING 
TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, at 2 
(2009), available at http://www.shearrnan.com/files/upload/FCP A_ Digest. pdf [hereinafter 
FCPA DIGEST]. Another prominent FCPA practice has characterized the recent enforcement 
pace as "frenetic." Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Publications, 2008 Mid-Year FCPA Update 
(July 7, 2008), http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2008Mid-YearFCPAUpdate.aspx. 
9. For example, the number ofFCPA-related enforcement actions by the SEC and DOJ 
over the last four years is roughly ten times the number of actions from the five years preceding 
the OECD Convention. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER J. STESKAL, FENWICK & WEST LLP, SECURITIES 
LITIGATION ALERT: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: THE NEXT CORPORATE SCANDAL? 3 
(2008), available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications!Litigation/sec/Sec_Litigation 
_Alert_ 0 1-28-08.pdf. 
10. See, e.g., Beverley Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money 
Argument, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 207, 207-09 (1996) (exploring the influence of Transparency 
International on the corruption debate); Marie M. Dalton, Note, Efficiency v. Morality: The 
Codification of Cultural Norms in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 
583, 583-84 (2006) (juxtaposing moral and economic justifications for prohibiting bribery); 
Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Comment, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REv. 861,861-62 (2001). 
11. See, e.g., Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Morality and Colonialism: A 
Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
877, 894 (2000) (arguing that claims of universal morality have justified exploitation by the 
"north" of the "south"); Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to 
Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419,421-22 (1999) (casting anti-bribery legislation as a 
form of cultural imperialism); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical 
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229, 280 (1997) 
(characterizing such legislation as culturally insensitive); Christopher J. Duncan, Comment, The 
1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism?, 1 
2010] ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION 355 
liability, 12 and issues associated with extraterritorial application, 13 they 
have yet to engage the more fundamental questions concerning whether 
the statute's impact is congruent with its underlying policies. The surge 
in enforcement activity provides a data set from which scholars can 
begin to study these effects. While the legislation has almost certainly 
succeeded to some extent in achieving its manifest purpose of curbing 
bribery, 14 the data thus far strongly suggest an additional and more 
problematic outcome: Companies subject to anti-bribery legislation are 
investing less in countries where bribery is perceived to be more 
prevalent 15 The difference is subtle, but critically important: 
Enforcement of anti-bribery legislation is not just deterring bribery, but 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & PoL'Y J. 16:1, 16:3-:6, & 16:4 n.14 (2000) (exploring, generally, the cultural 
clash that anti-bribery enforcement creates in developing countries). 
12. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 2 (1998) (analyzing parent liability under both the 
accounting and anti-bribery provisions); Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little 
More Action: Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions 
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 285, 285-86 (2007) 
(describing the theories of liability behind the new era of enforcement); Pines, supra note 2, at 
195. 
13. See, e.g., H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments 
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government's Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?, 
26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 239 (2001) (exploring various justifications for international 
jurisdiction); Ellen S. Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar 
Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 325 (1997) (looking at the problem of extraterritorial criminal 
prosecution). 
14. Many have argued that enforcement could, or should, be more effective. See, e.g., Tor 
Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. 
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 83, 85, 92 (2007) (contending that the legislation has had insufficient 
impact on bribery); Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Within the American Response to Domestic Corruption, 15 DICK. J. INT'LL. 509, 511 (1997) 
(finding the pre-OECD legislation to be ineffective at curbing bribery); Philip Segal, Coming 
Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 169, 175 (2006) (concluding that legislation is under-enforced due to 
enforcement costs); Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 665, 669-73 (2004) (using game theory to 
explain why enforcement has not been more rigorous); Alexandros Zervos, Amending the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Repealing the Exemption for "Routine Government Action" 
Payments, 25 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 251, 254 (2006) (suggesting repealing the grease payment 
exemption to combat lower-level corruption); Andrea Goldbarg, Note, The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and Structural Corruption, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 273, 275 (2000) (discussing the 
legislation and criticizing it for treating the symptoms rather than the causes of corruption); 
Rebecca Koch, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It's Time to Cut Back the Grease and 
Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 379, 380 (2005) (taking issue with the 
grease payment exception). 
15. See, e.g., Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 
39 J. INT'LBus. STUD. 634,635 (2008) [hereinafter Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws]; 
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 807, 807 (2006) 
[hereinafter Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares]. 
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is deterring investment. 
It is easy to assume, as many do today, that deterring investment in 
bribery-prone countries is the legislation's tacit purpose-that economic 
withdrawal from such countries is the natural and expected, if not 
intended, outcome of anti-bribery legislation. According to this view, 
we can and should assess the legislation's effectiveness by the extent to 
which it "induc[es~!foreign] investors ... to reduce their investments in 
corrupt countries." This view further holds that developed nations can 
effectively combat overseas bribery by economically disengaging from 
the countries whose governments tolerate it. Because developing 
countries depend on foreign investment to stimulate economic 
development, their governments will eventually succumb to pressure 
and implement reforms. 
There is of course a familiar, if not altogether comfortable, term for 
this phenomenon: economic sanctions. 17 The discomfort arises from a 
widely-shared concern that the victims of the sanctioned practice, rather 
than the perpetrators, will feel the brunt of the sanctions' impact. We 
may further suspect that despite these costs, the sanctions will fail to 
effect meaningful reform. Our fears are likely more pronounced where 
the target country is poor; they may be more pronounced yet when the 
country otherwise enjoys economic conditions that are highly conducive 
to growth. 
Regrettably, anti-bribery legislation tends to sanction precisely these 
countries. Accordingly, although scholars and regulators have not 
previously applied the label of economic sanctions to the FCP A and its 
progeny, the data and literature suggest that we should do so now. 
Scholars must begin to wrestle with its implications, and to critically 
examine the assumption that the operation of anti-bribery legislation as 
de facto sanctions constitutes a successful implementation of the 
statute's underlying policies. 
This Article argues firmly that it does not. Focusing in depth on the 
FCP A as the origin and template for international anti-bribery 
legislation, 18 this Article shows that the legislation evinces no design to 
function as de facto sanctions. Two principal sources support this 
argument, the first of which is well-known, though the second is not. 
The first is the statute's text, which plainly applies only to the suppliers 
16. Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws, supra note 15, at 635. 
17. See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOTI, KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTI & 
BARBARA 0EGG, EcONOMIC SANCilONS RECONSIDERED (3d ed. 2007) (discussing economic 
sanctions). 
18. For a discussion of the FCPA as a predecessor to the OECD, see, for example, Brown, 
supra note 13, at 265-320; DoN ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT§ 13:2 (2000). 
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of bribes. 19 The text does not provide for the punishment of the 
recipients or solicitors ofbribes, much less the governments that tolerate 
them. The second source is much more illuminating on this question, 
though astonishingly, almost completely unknown among lawyers and 
scholars. That source is the statute's legislative history, which has not 
been analyzed at meaningful length in the academic scholarship on anti-
bribery legislation. 20 A thorough examination of the legislative history 
reveals absolutely no basis for the proposition that the legislation should 
punish governments that tolerate bribery by withdrawing financial 
support in the hopes that economic hardship might incentivize reform. 
Businessmen, interest group leaders, congressmen, members of three 
presidential administrations, and indeed three U.S. Presidents, spanning 
both political parties and more than twenty years, provided statements 
on the legislative record relevant to this question, and did so in virtual 
unanimity.21 While they specifically considered the practical effects of 
this legislation, they never contemplated that those effects would 
resemble economic sanctions. 
Indeed, they believed exactly the opposite. A study of the statute's 
history, similar to the text, very strongly supports an altogether different 
mechanism for achieving the statute's goal of promoting ethical 
overseas business practices. Those who participated in congressional 
hearings on the need for the legislation prohibiting overseas bribery 
clearly expected the statute to encourage investment in transitional 
economies to promote their development and build economic and 
political alliances.Z2 The legislative history portrays the FCP A as a 
product of two formative events: Watergate and the Cold War. While 
the former's influence is widely recognized, the latter has been largely 
forgotten. 23 Taken together, these events exposed a degree of corruption 
in U.S. business and government that, according to those who testified 
before Congress, tarnished the U.S. image abroad and weakened its 
standing in a bi-polar political struggle. To build and preserve critical 
alliances, the United States sought to announce to the world its intention 
19. See infra Part II.R 
20. For a thorough discussion of the procedural (but not thematic) legislative history of 
the FCPA, see GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT: ANATOMY OF A STATUTE 17-19 (1982). 
21. See infra Part IV.A & Part IV.R 
22. See infra Part IV .A & Part IV.R 
23. For a rare, albeit brief, account of the FCPA's historical context that recognizes the 
importance of foreign policy considerations (and tacitly acknowledges the Cold War), see 
RALPH H. FOLSOM, MiCHAEL W. GoRDON & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS, TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 392 (2005) ("The FCPA is a response to real 
and perceived harm to U.S. foreign relations with important, developed friendly nations, and the 
interest of the United States to prevent U.S. persons from making payments which might 
embarrass the United States in conducting foreign policy."). 
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to implement the highest standards of business ethics. Through its 
continued engagement in-rather than withdrawal from-fragile 
transitional economies, the United States would promote ethics and 
economic development while advancing its foreign policy goals. This is 
the logic on which the FCP A was founded, and it is not the logic of 
sanctions. 
The FCPA ultimately proves to be a large-scale study in the law of 
unintended consequences. Part II of this Article provides an 
introduction to the statute and shows that its manifest purpose is to 
punish those who supply bribes, and not to punish the recipients or 
solicitors, much less their governments or their fellow citizens. Part III 
demonstrates that the FCP A and related legislation, as presently 
enforced, constitute de facto economic sanctions against emerging 
markets. It first discusses the political science and economics literature 
regarding the purpose and effects of economic sanctions. It then 
discusses the quantitative evidence on the effects of anti-bribery 
enforcement, and shows that it is appropriate and useful to think of anti-
bribery legislation, as currently enforced, as de facto economic 
sanctions. It further shows that the majority of the FCP A enforcement 
actions have occurred in economies that are today regarded as emerging 
markets, and that the economic sanctions therefore have their principal 
effect in countries that otherwise present historic opportunities for 
economic growth. Part IV explores for the first time in academic legal 
literature the legislative history of the FCP A. It introduces the colorful 
and animated disagreement on numerous fundamental issues 
surrounding the need for anti-bribery legislation, and then the striking 
unanimity on the statute's fundamental purpose: to promote, and not 
deter, investment in developing economies. Part V offers proposed 
reforms-including expanded membership in the OECD, the 
promulgation of more demand-side anti-bribery laws, and a reevaluation 
of the underlying theories of liability under the FCP A-that might 
enable the statute to achieve its manifest purpose of curbing bribery 
without collaterally curbing investment. Part VI concludes that 
sanctioning emerging markets to effect bribery-reducing reforms is an 
enterprise fraught with ethical, economic, and foreign policy risks that 
scholars and policymakers should promptly address. 
II. THE TEXT OF THE FCPA: PUNISHING THE SUPPLIER AND NOT THE 
RECIPIENT 
This Part provides a brief historical account of the FCP A's origins 
and introduces the statute's core provisions. Specifically, this Part 
argues that scholars to date have only partially understood the historical 
events that precipitated the introduction and passage of anti-corruption 
legislation. A more complete understanding of the FCPA's context 
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reveals that the statute was designed as a tool of foreign policy, and not 
merely of business ethics. Notably it is a foreign policy tool that evinces 
no design to control foreign actors or to ultimately sanction foreign 
governments. The statute's text makes abundantly clear that the statute 
is designed to impact the supplier of bribes rather than the solicitors, 
recipients, or the governments that tolerate them. Moreover, the 
statute's purpose of punishing suppliers, rather than foreign 
governments, is further suggested by one statutory exception and one 
affirmative defense. 
A. Historical Context: Bribery as a Foreign Policy Problem 
Scholars attempting to describe the origins of the FCP A have 
produced several variations on the following theme. 24 The Watergate 
scandal in the early 1970s exposed illegal payments made by numerous 
U.S. companies to domestic political campaigns. In response to this 
discovery, in 1974 the SEC conducted an investigation and determined 
that payments were made not only to U.S. political campaigns, but to 
overseas campaigns and officers as well, and were typically accounted 
for through "slush funds." As part of the post-Watergate reforms, 
Congress sought to supplement existing domestic anti-bribery 
legislation with comparable legislation that would prohibit payments to 
overseas officials and require more accurate accounting. 
This story thus accurately characterizes the FCP A as an outgrowth of 
the post-Watergate domestic crisis in confidence. Americans had lost a 
degree of trust in their political and business leaders, and this legislation 
would help to ensure the proper conduct of U.S. business. By this 
account, it is quite predictable and not particularly noteworthy that the 
ensuing legislation primarily sought to punish companies and 
individuals doing some substantial portion of their business in or 
through the United States. Watergate, after all, was a domestic problem; 
the solution was a matter of domestic policy, meant primarily to punish 
domestic actors. 
This conventional story is true, but it is not the whole truth. Indeed, 
there was another event involving bribery that likewise alerted Congress 
to the need for legislation prohibiting overseas payments, and which 
24. See, e.g., Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law Against 
Foreign Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International Lawyer, 5 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. I, 5 (2006); Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International 
Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J. CoMP. L. SuPP. 593, 595-96 (2002); Stanley Sporkin, The 
Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its 
Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269, 271-75 (1998); Daniel Patrick Ashe, 
Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United States: The Recent Extraterritorial 
Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2897, 2902--{}3 
(2005). 
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almost immediately produced congressional hearings. This event, 
however, occurred prior to and independently of Watergate. In 1971, 
Congress provided the Lockheed Corporation,25 then a major 
manufacturer of civilian and military aircraft, with a $250 million 
federal loan guarantee to prevent bankruptcy. 26 Soon afterwards, 
regulators discovered that Lockheed had, over the course of many years, 
paid numerous bribes to foreign governments to secure contracts. 27 By 
the time of the earliest congressional hearings concerning the need for 
international anti-bribery legislation, Lockheed had already disclosed to 
the United States government that it had paid several multi-million 
dollar bribes to various developed and developing countries, particularly 
the Netherlands, Japan, and Italy, and had caused scandals in each of 
those countries that were embarrassing both to those countries and to 
the United States.28 
Because these bribes were paid to foreign governments and 
provoked public outcry in those countries, they were not merely a 
domestic policy problem; rather, they raised the issue of U.S. relations 
with foreign countries, and the solution would necessarily implicate 
foreign policy interests. As will be shown below, the ensuing legislation 
was in fact widely understood as an instrument of foreign policy, 
intended to impact relations between the United States and other 
nations, and not merely a component of a domestic ethics crisis. In light 
of the Lockheed payments, and the recognition that they constituted a 
foreign policy problem in need of a foreign policy solution, it is far 
more notable that the legislation was not designed to punish the 
recipients or solicitors of such bribes, let alone the governments that 
tolerate bribery. This foreign policy tool, both as originally passed and 
subsequently amended, was drafted to target and punish only the 
suppliers ofbribes. 
B. The FCPA 's Exclusive Focus on the Supply of Bribes 
The statute's exclusive focus on the supply ofbribes is evident in the 
persons who are subject to its prohibitions and the bases of jurisdiction 
over them, as well as the definition of the prohibited conduct. The anti-
25. Lockheed Corporation merged with Martin Marietta Corporation in 1995 to form the 
Lockheed Martin Corporation. Company News; Martin Marietta-Lockheed Merger Is Approved, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at 04. 
26. Lockheed Bribery: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, 94th Cong. I (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Banking Hearing] (statement of Sen. 
William Proxmire). 
27. See Lockheed's Defiance: A Right to Bribe?, TIME, Aug. 18, 1975, available at 
http://www .time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171 ,917751-1 ,00 .html. 
28. 1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 40-42 (statement of Sen. William 
Proxmire). 
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bribery provisions of the statute apply to three different classes of 
persons: "issuers,"29 "domestic concerns,"30 and "persons other than 
issuers or domestic concerns."31 First, the anti-bribery provisions apply 
to any issuer that has a class of securities registered under § 12 of the 
Exchange Act or which is required to file reports under § 15( d) of that 
act. This prohibition applies to any officer, director, employee, or agent 
of such an issuer, or any stockholder acting on behalf of that issuer.32 
The 1977 Senate Report explains that the purpose of this phrase is to 
make clear that it is corporate or business bribery which is being 
proscribed, rather than individual bribery. 33 Second, "domestic concern" 
is "any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United 
States,"34 and applies to commercial entities including "any corporation, 
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, 
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its 
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized 
under the laws of a [U.S. state,] territory, possession, or 
commonwealth. "35 The 1977 Senate Report elaborates that this latter 
section is intended to apply to entities which are "owned or controlled 
by individuals who are citizens or nationals of the United States" and 
have their principal place of business in the United States or a territory, 
possession, or commonwealth.36 The third category of person subject to 
the anti-bribery sections is first identified as a "person," other than an 
issuer or domestic concern, who is in the "territory" of the United States 
at the time of the conduct in question,37 and who is not a national of the 
United States or a commercial entity legally organized in the United 
States.38 This third category was established by the FCPA's 1998 
amendments to satisfy the OECD convention's requirement that statutes 
29. 15 u.s.c. § 78dd-l (2006). 
30. /d. § 78dd-2 (2006). 
31. /d. § 78dd-3 (2006). 
32. /d.§ 78dd-l(a) (2006). 
33. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 11 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4108. 
Whether an act of bribery is determined to be "by the corporation or by an individual acting on 
his own will depend on all the facts and circumstances, including the position of the employee, 
the care with which the board of directors supervises management, the care with which 
management supervises employees in sensitive positions and its adherence to the strict 
accounting standards" provided in the section. /d. 
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(l)(A) (2006). 
35. /d.§ 78dd-2(h)(l)(B) (2006). 
36. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 17. For more recent comments by the U.S. Department of 
Justice, see DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY-PERSON'S GUIDE TO FCPA §A, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/docs/dojdocb.html [hereinafter DOJ GUIDE] ("U.S. parent 
corporations may be held liable for the acts of foreign subsidiaries where they authorized, 
directed, or controlled the activity in question."). 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006). 
38. /d.§ 78dd-3(f)(l)(2006). 
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cover "any person."39 As a result of this amendment, foreign 
corporations, even if subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation, as well as the 
employees of such corporations, may now be independently liable under 
the FCPA.40 However, liability continues to attach only to the supplier, 
rather than the recipient or solicitor of the bribe, and the supplier must 
have done business in or through the United States. Even after the 
modifications of the FCP A to conform it to the OECD convention, the 
legislation remains targeted exclusively at suppliers. 
As originally drafted, the statute required the traditional 
jurisdictional hook for expansive congressional action: that the conduct 
occurred through "any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce."41 The 1998 amendments provided an additional basis of 
jurisdiction, the nationality principle of jurisdiction,42 codified with the 
section heading "Alternative jurisdiction.'.43 With that amendment it 
became illegal for any issuer or domestic concern or an officer, director, 
employee, or agent thereof who is a "United States person,"44 "to 
corruptly do any act outside the United States in furtherance of' a bribe 
or authorization of a bribe irrespective of whether the payor used 
interstate commerce.45 This language implements the OECD 
Convention's requirement that member nations extend coverage of their 
anti-bribery statutes to acts outside the United States.46 Although the 
language limits liability to conduct taken by persons on behalf of issuers 
or domestic concerns, the legislative history indicates an intention that 
"principles of liability, including principles of vicarious liability" 
already applicable under the FCPA would render U.S. issuers or 
domestic concerns liable for the conduct of officers, directors, 
employees, agents, or stockholders outside of the United States 
regardless of their nationality.47 As a result of the 1998 amendments, 
U.S. issuers and domestic concerns may now be liable under either 
territorial or nationality jurisdictional principles.48 But even taken 
39. S. REP. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998). 
40. See ZARIN, supra note 18, at 4-9; see also Mike Koehler, Why Compliance with the 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Matters in China, CHINA L. & PRAC. (2008), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1396267. 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2006). 
42. ZARIN, supra note 18, at 4-12. 
43. 15 u.s.c. §§ 78dd-l(g), 78dd-2(i) (2006). 
44. A "United States person," in this context, is defined as any "national of the United 
States ... or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, 
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the laws of the United 
States" or its territory, etc. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g)(2) (2006). 
45. /d. § 78dd-l(g)(1). 
46. S. REP. No. 105-277, at 3 (1998). 
47. /d. at 4. 
48. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 36, at § A. This new section does not depend on the Interstate 
Commerce Clause to establish jurisdiction. Rather, it falls under Congress' constitutional 
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together, it remains true that the statute reaches only those corporations 
and individuals that have substantial ties of some kind to the United 
States. Its intended target remains fairly close-range. 
The proscribed conduct involves three elements: the payment, the 
recipient, and the purpose. It defines the payment as the "furtherance of 
an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of 
any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving 
of anything of value."49 After defining the payment, it defines the 
persons to whom the payn}ent must be made to violate the FCP A. First 
is any "foreign official,"50 which is "any officer or employee of a 
foreign ~overnment or any department, agency, or instrumentality 
thereof." 1 Second is any foreign political party or party official or any 
candidate for foreign political office. 52 The third group consists of third 
parties, such as agents, distributors, or joint venture partners, 53 defined 
in the statute as any "person," to whom money or a thing of value is 
given while "knowing"54 that any portion of that money or thing of 
value will be "offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly," to any 
of the individuals in the first two groups above. 55 
For all three categories of recipients, the act must be done for one of 
two prohibited p!l_IPoses--direct influence or indirect influence. Under 
direct influence, 56 the payee is the person whom the payor seeks to 
authority to "'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations' and to 'define and punish ... Offenses 
against the Law ofNations."' S. REP. No. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, 
cis. 3 & 10). 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a). 
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(l) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(l); id. § 78dd-3(a)(l). 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(l)(A) (2006); id. §78dd-2(h)(2)(A); id. § 78dd-3(f)(2)(A). A 
1977 House Report suggests that this definition should not include an employee "whose duties 
are essentially ministerial or clerical." H. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977). After the 1998 
amendments, language was added to provide that a foreign official may also include an officer 
or employee of a "public international organization" or any person acting in an official capacity 
for or on behalf of such an organization. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(l)(A) (2006); id. § 78dd-
2(h)(2)(A); id. § 78dd-3(f)(2)(A). The purpose of this language is to comply with the OECD 
Convention. S. REP. No. 105-277, at 3 (1998). Nonetheless, The DOJ interprets this section to 
hold that the prohibition applies to payments to "any public official, regardless of rank or 
position," and that it is meant to focus on the ''purpose of the payment instead of the particular 
duties of the official receiving" the bribe. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 36, at§ D. 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(2) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(2); id. § 78dd-3(a)(2). This term is 
not defined in the statute. 
53. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 36, at ''Third Party Payments." 
54. In 1988, The statute expanded the definition of knowledge to include "deliberate 
ignorance," which under the statutory language is satisfied when a person is "aware of a high 
probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such 
circumstance does not exist." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(h)(3); id. § 78dd-
3(f)(3). 
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(3) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(a)(3); id. § 78dd-3(a)(3). 
56. Although, direct influence is not used in the statute in this context. 
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influence. It can take any of three forms: 1) "influencing" of any "act or 
decision" of that individual,57 2) "inducing" that individual to "do or 
omit to do any act in violation" of that individual's duty,58 or 3) 
"securing any improper advantage" with that individual. 59 The latter 
phrase, "securing any improper advantage," was added in 1998 to 
mirror the language of the OECD Convention.60 Under indirect 
influence, the payee is not the person whom the payor seeks to 
influence, but is instead someone with the capacity to influence the 
ultimate target. This category includes "inducing" that individual to 
"use his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof 
to affect or influence any act or decision of such government or 
instrumentality."61 
For both direct and indirect influence, the act must be done to assist 
in "obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business toj 
any person,"62 commonly referred to as the business purpose test.6 
Moreover, the 1977 House Report makes clear that the corrupt 
requirement is satisfied even where the act is not "fully consummated," 
or does not "succeed in producing the desired outcome. "64 
Again, these provisions, on their face, are directed only toward the 
supplier. Even where the recipient is identified and defined in the 
statute, it is not done to bring the recipient within the scope of the 
FCPA's punitive measures. Rather, the recipient is defined only to 
further clarify the conduct that is prohibited for the would-be supplier. 
C. The "Grease Payment" Exception and the Written Law 
Defense: Tolerating Host-Country Bribery 
The statute's express exception, and one of its two affirmative 
defenses, reflect a degree of tolerance of host-country bribery that 
would not be expected from a statute designed to punish foreign 
governments for condoning such conduct. The statutory exception is for 
"facilitatin§ or expediting" payments, otherwise known as "grease 
payments," 5 which the statute defines as payments to a foreign official, 
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006); id § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(i); id. § 78dd-
3(a)(1)(A)(i). 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2006); id § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(ii); id. § 78dd-
3(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(A)(iii) (2006); id § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A)(iii); id. § 78dd-
3(a)(1 )(A)(iii). 
60. S. REP. No. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (citing OECD Convention, supra note 5, at art. 1, 
para. 1). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(B) (2006); id § 78dd-3(a)(1)(B); see id. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(B). 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(l) (2006); id § 78dd-2(a)(1); id. § 78dd-3(a)(l). 
63. See DOJ GUIDE, supra note 36, at§ E. 
64. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977). 
65. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977). 
2010] ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION 365 
political party, or party official intended "to expedite or to secure the 
performance of a routine governmental action" by that payee.66 The 
1977 House Report distinguishes facilitating payments from bribery by 
distinguishing between payments that "cause an official to exercise 
other than his free will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or 
decision" versus payments that "merely move a particular matter toward 
an eventual act or decision or which do not involve any discretionary 
action. "67 An example provided in the legislative history is "a gratuity 
paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a customs 
document."68 The statute further makes clear what routine governmental 
action does not include: any decision by a foreign official "whether, or 
on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with" a 
party, or any action by a foreign official "involved in the decision-
making process to encourage a decision to award new business to or 
continue business" with a party. 69 The 1977 Senate Report reaffirms 
that this section is meant to apply to "grease payments."70 
In this context, the 1977 House Report demonstrates a degree of 
cultural sensitivity to differing cultural norms surrounding conduct that 
in the United States is considered bribery. It explains that while 
facilitating payments "may be reprehensible in the United States, the 
committee recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere 
in the world and that it is not feasible for the United States to attempt 
unilaterally to eradicate all such payments."71 Far from expressing 
moral outrage, the report suggests that host-country bribery is to some 
extent inevitable, and even tolerable. 
This tolerance is more powerfully apparent in the statute's 
affirmative defense that the payment, gift, offer, or promise was legal 
under the "written laws and regulations" of the payee's country.72 The 
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (2006); id § 78dd-2(b); id. § 78dd-3(b). The statute provides 
categories of sample exceptions (although the common characteristic of the items in each 
category is not always self-evident): "obtaining permits or licenses; processing visas or work 
orders; providing police protection, mail service, or scheduling inspections related to cross-
country transit of goods; providing utilities service, loading or unloading cargo, or protecting 
perishable products from deterioration; and 'actions of a similar nature. "'15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
l(f)(3)(A)(i) to (v) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)(i) to (v); id. § 78dd-3(f)(4)(A)(i) to (v). 
67. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977). 
68. Id. 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(B) (2006); id § 78dd-2(h)(4)(B); id § 78dd-3(t)(4)(B). 
70. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977). The statute provides the additional example of 
placing a transatlantic telephone call. Id. 
71. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977). 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(l) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(c)(l); id. § 78dd-3(c)(l). The statute 
provides another affirmative defense that is less relevant to the present analysis-that the 
payment, gift, offer, or promise was for a "reasonable and bona fide expenditure" that is by or 
for the payor and was directly related to either: I) the "promotion, demonstration, or explanation 
of products or services," or 2) ''the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign 
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adjective "written" was added in 1988 to "make clear that the absence 
of written laws in a foreign official's country would not by itself be 
sufficient to satisfy this defense."73 The absence of a prohibition against 
bribery would not, then, be a defense, but the presence of a written law 
expressly permitting such payments would be a defense. If host-country 
reforms were the express object of the legislation, it is hard to imagine 
that the FCP A would permit this defense. 
Admittedly, neither the grease payment exception nor the written 
law defense constitutes overwhelming evidence that reforming countries 
perceived to have a greater tolerance for bribery is beyond the statute's 
purpose. But taken in conjunction with the core provisions, the message 
becomes clear: The payor, and not the payee, is the party held 
responsible under the statute. There is absolutely no part of the statute 
suggesting that the solicitor, recipient, or its government should be held 
responsible or punished for the bribe. The statute is thus "supply-side;" 
the "demand-side" is well beyond its purview. 
Ill. THE FCPA As ENFORCED: DE FACTO SANCTIONS AGAINST 
EMERGING MARKETS 
Despite the plain meaning of the text (and, as will be shown in Part 
IV, the legislative history) the enforcement of the statute has produced a 
different result altogether. This part demonstrates that the FCP A, as 
enforced, operates as de facto economic sanctions against countries 
where substantial foreign direct investment is occurring and yet which 
have substantial levels of corruption. Generally speaking, these will be 
the emerging markets. While economists have for years been using 
empirical data and quantitative methodologies to explore the collateral 
effects of anti-bribery legislation, legal scholars have yet to recognize 
the importance of their work and explore its implications. This section 
seeks to repair that disconnect. 
Part III.A draws on economic sanctions literature in economics and 
political science to provide a framework for understanding the impact of 
anti-bribery enforcement as sanctions. Part III.B discusses the 
quantitative research showing that enforcement of anti-corruption 
legislation has resulted not just in a reduction in bribery, but in a 
reduction in investment in countries where bribery is perceived to be 
more common-that is, the legislation effectively functions as 
economic sanctions against such countries. Part III.C shows that a 
majority of the FCP A prosecutions have occurred with respect to 
government or agency thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2)(A) to (B) (2006); id. § 78dd-
2(c)(2)(A) to (B); id. § 78dd-3(c)(2)(A) to (B). Examples provided in the statute include travel 
and lodging expenses. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(c)(2); id. § 78dd-3(c)(2). 
73. H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 922 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1547, 1954. 
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emerging markets. Part III.D thus arrives at the counterintuitive and 
alarming conclusion that anti-bribery enforcement amounts to de facto 
economic sanctions against emerging markets. 
A Defining Economic Sanctions: Drawing Upon Political 
Science and Economics 
The most comprehensive treatment of the definition, history, and 
effectiveness of economic sanctions is the collaborative work of Gary 
Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J_ Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott1 and Barbara Oegg (HSEO), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 4 Originally 
published in 1985 and updated in 1990 and then again in 2007' they 
analyze 174 examples of economic sanctions, and draw upon the 
literature in political science and economics to understand their purpose 
and effect Theirs and related work provide valuable groundwork for 
evaluating the extent to which anti-bribery legislation may be regarded 
as sanctions, and the extent to which it is likely to prove effective. 
HSEO define sanctions as the "deliberate, government-inspired 
withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial 
relations."75 To a lawyer, this definition has four elements: the 1) 
deliberate; 2) government-inspired; 3) withdrawal or threat of 
withdrawal; 4) of customary trade or financial relations.76 In sanctions 
jargon, the country applying the sanctions is often called the "sender" 
and the sanctioned country is the "target." With respect to the senders, 
sanctions can be unilateral or multilateral, although the latter usually 
involve major powers persuading their smaller allies to join.77 Sanctions 
rarely tum out in practice to be a complete blockade, either because of 
problems of enforcement, the so-called "black knights" that move in to 
supply the prohibited goods, or in the case of multilateral sanctions, the 
limited extent of international cooperation.78 Episodes thus vary greatly 
74. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17. 
75. HUFBAUERETAL.,supranote 17,at3. 
76. An alternative definition of sanctions suggests that any conduct that intentionally 
deprives a people of its "means to an effective economic life" should be considered sanctions. 
GEOFF SIMONS, IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LEGAL REMEDY OR GENOCIDAL TOOL? 11 
(1999). This definition would even treat military conduct that adversely impacted a target's 
economy as sanctions, and is thus significantly broader than any generally accepted usage. 
Another, more often used definition of sanctions is "coercive economic measures taken against 
one or more countries to force a change in politics, or at least to demonstrate a country's opinion 
about the other's policies." DIANNE E. RENNACK & ROBERT D. SHUEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO 
ACHIEVE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS: DISCUSSION AND GUIDE TO CURRENT LAW 2 (1998), cited 
in HOSSEIN G. ASKARI, JOl-IN FORRER, HILDY TEEGEN & ]lAWEN YANG, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: 
EXAMINING THEIR PHILOSOPHY AND EFFICACY 14 (2003). Because this defmition disregards the 
possibility that sanctions may be intended as expressive tools, and may or may not be designed 
to "bring about a change in behavior or policies," it is not used here. 
77. HUFBAUERET AL., supra note 17, at 5. 
78. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 57-58. 
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in the degree of sanctioning that actually occurs. Sanctions can involve 
any or all of three types of customary trade or financial relations: 
limitations on imports, limitations on exports, and restricting the flow of 
finance. 79 The target country need not be the adversary of the sender, 
and indeed, many of the most successful documented instances of 
sanctions have involved a friendly target who promptly acquiesced to 
the sender's demands.80 
The nature and function of sanctions have evolved historically; the 
sanctions that are commonly used, and which the FCP A resembles in 
important ways, are comparatively new. While the history of sanctions 
can be traced as far back as Pericles' Megarian Decree of 432 B.C., 
sanctions generally became a regular and integral instrument of foreign 
policy, as a substitute for or at least a precursor to military action, after 
World War I. Sanctions became much more prevalent after World War 
II with the onset of the Cold War, as both the United States and the 
Soviet Union sought to effect dramatic reform or even the all-out 
collapse of various regimes within their respective spheres. The 
sanctions they imposed were typically comprehensive, meaning that 
they sought to produce a complete blockade of all relations with the 
target country. 
After the end of the Cold War, the scholarly and regulatory 
community recognized that these comprehensive sanctions were 
perhaps too blunt an instrument. They frequently resulted in undue 
damage to the very people who were already victimized by an 
oppressive government, or to neighboring countries. This collateral 
damage would often occur despite the complete failure of the sanctions 
to reform the target regime. Indeed, the multilateral sanctions against 
Iraq that the UN imposed in 1990, and the colossal harm that resulted to 
the Iraqi people, were perhaps the most dramatic example. In order to 
continue to use sanctions to achieve foreign goals as an alternative to 
military intervention while avoiding this collateral damage, countries 
began to develop "targeted sanctions."81 These sanctions involve more 
specific, tailored methods to punish governing elites and disrupt their 
activities while protecting the population. 82 Examples have included 
arms embargoes, travel bans (either general travel into or out of the 
country, or travel restrictions on specific individuals or organizations) 
or, commodity bans such as oil or diamonds (or, as in the case of North 
Korea, banning the importation of luxury goods to deny its leader, Kim 
79. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 44-45. 
80. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 60. 
81. See, e.g., David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart 
Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 1, 
2 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002). 
82. See id. 
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Jong-11, some of his favorite habits). Most recently, the United States 
has imposed various targeted sanctions to combat terrorism, such as 
freezing the assets of designated foreign terrorist organizations or 
prohibiting all transactions with specially designated terrorists. 
Notably, these targeted sanctions are quite frequently administered 
against an open-ended category of nations defined by their behavior, 
rather than one or a few named nations. Examples have included the 
prohibition on certain forms of assistance to former Soviet-bloc 
countries for engaging in gross human rights violations (amendments to 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), the decision by the United States 
to vote against the granting of loans by international financial 
institutions to countries condoning female genital mutilation (part of the 
Omnibus Appropriations Act for 1997) or the imposition of sanctions 
against countries engaged in a pattern of religious persecution (the 
International Religious Freedom Act). 
Sanctions may serve either of two purposes, both of which are 
relevant to the FCP A. While the most obvious purpose of economic 
sanctions would be to "coerc[ e] target governments into particular 
avenues of response,"83 economists and political scientists have 
explained that economic sanctions might also be designed to accomplish 
an entirely different, non-instrumental goal. Under this alternative 
theory, sanctions are not necessarily designed to effect reforms in the 
target countries, and their success thus should not necessarily be 
measured by the extent of any resulting reforms. William H. Kaempfer 
and Anton D. Lowenberg have contrasted the "instrumental" theory of 
sanctions with the "expressive" purpose. 84 According to this theory, the 
value of sanctions lies in "takinf., a moral stance against some other 
nation's objectionable behavior." Where a target country offends the 
sender state, but the sender's leaders may deem more severe 
intervention such as military action inappropriate, the sender's leaders 
may nonetheless feel compelled to "do something."86 While the costs of 
military action may be too high, the political costs of doing nothing may 
be considerable to the extent that it projects weakness.87 Such domestic 
political pressure can "persuade the government in the sanctioning 
nation to respond by imposing sanctions to meet goals other than target 
83. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 5. 
84. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, The Theory of International Economic 
Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach, 78 AM. EcoN. REv. 786, 786 (1988). 
85. /d.; see also PER LUNDBORG, THE ECONOMICS OF EXPORT EMBARGOES: THE CASE OF 
THE US-SOVIET GRAIN SUSPENSION ( 1987). 
86. Ivan Eland, Economic Sanctions as Tools of Foreign Policy, in ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: 
PANACEA OR PEACEBUILIDNG IN A POST-COLD WAR WORLD? 29 (David Cortright & George 
Lopez eds., 1995). 
87. See generally DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOX: ECONOMIC 
STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ( 1999) (discussing political costs). 
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compliance. "88 Indeed, the expressive purpose of sanctions sometimes 
occurs despite its instrumental ineffectiveness, but often the sanctions 
are "designed deliberately to be ineffectual."89 
Unlike expressive sanctions, measuring the effectiveness of 
instrumental sanctions is a tricky and contested matter. HSEO have 
developed a comprehensive rubric for evaluating the instrumental 
success of sanctions, and have undertaken to identify the variables that 
might explain those results. They recognize that the instrumental goals 
of sanctions might lie anywhere on a spectrum that ranges from targeted 
policy changes (such as curbing religious persecution or drug 
trafficking), more dramatic policy changes (such as changing the 
alliances of a smaller nation), impairing military capacity, disrupting a 
military action, or ultimately, to completely changing the target 
country's regime.90 They have found that whether sanctions achieve 
their intended result depends on quite a number of economic and 
political variables. Among the political goals that bear the most 
relevance to anti-corruption legislation include the extent of 
international cooperation in enforcing the sanctions; whether both the 
senders and targets are members of the international organization that is 
coordinating the administration of the sanctions; the "warmth" of prior 
relations between senders and targets; and the political system of the 
target nations, ranging between autocratic and democratic.91 Economic 
variables include the costs imposed on the target countries; the costs to 
the sender countries; prior commercial relations between senders and 
targets; the relative economic size of the targets and senders; and the 
economic health and political stability of the targets. 
Generally, targeted sanctions have thus far proven to be much less 
successful than comprehensive sanctions in achieving their instrumental 
goals. David Cortright and George Lopez, who have done the most 
extensive work in the field of targeted sanctions, concluded that 
"comprehensive, rigorously enforced sanctions are more likely to be 
successful than limited, unenforced measures"92 while Kimberly Ann 
Elliott has declared the collective experience of targeted sanctions 
"disappointing."93 Still, they remain an integral part of foreign policy, 
88. Eland, supra note 86, at 29. 
89. /d. Scholars have further debated the role of an expressive function in law more 
generally. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 
2021, 2035 (1996). 
90. HOFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 52-53. 
91. /d. at 55. 
92. Cortright & Lopez, supra note 81, at 8. 
93. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions, in SMART 
SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFf, supra note 81, at 171; see also DAVID 
CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LoPEZ WITH RICHARD W. CONROY, JALEH 0ASHTJ-GIBSON & JULIA 
WAGLER, THE SANCTIONS DECADE: ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990s, at 209-12 
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have numerous advantages over comprehensive sanctions, and, perhaps 
with time, policymakers may learn how to utilize them more effectively. 
Economic sanctions, then, can take any of several forms, and 
promote any or all of various possible policy objectives. As will be 
shown below, the present enforcement regime of anti-bribery legislation 
in the United States and elsewhere demonstrates that this legislation 
can, and should, be understood as de facto sanctions. 
B. The Effect of Anti-Bribery Enforcement: Economic 
Withdrawal from Countries Where Bribery is Perceived 
to be More Prevalent 
In 1995, not quite twenty years after enactment of the FCPA and 
three years prior to the OECD treaty ratification, James Hines of the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government offered the first major 
contribution to the theory that anti-bribery legislation deterred 
investment in countries where bribery is perceived to be relatively 
prevalent.94 Hines analyzed the impact of the FCPA on U.S. investment 
by looking at four indicators ofU.S. business activity. First was foreign 
direct investment. 95 Because the threatened penalties of the FCP A raise 
the costs of doing business in higher risk countries, Hines reasoned that 
one possible impact of the FCP A would be a reduction in such 
business. 96 The second factor that Hines examined was capital-to--
labor ratios, which could be reduced as a result of the FCP A if firms 
conclude that an equally effective alternative to bribing local politicians 
would be to hire larger numbers of their constituents.97 Third, Hines 
looked at levels of joint-venture activity post-1977.98 The 1981 
Comptroller General's Report to Congress had documented the 
concerns raised by the U.S. business community that they could become 
liable for the bribes paid by their joint venture partners, and that some 
companies had withdrawn from such ventures as a result of the FCP A. 99 
Hines reasoned that evidence that firms "systematically avoided 
participation in joint ventures in corrupt countries after 1977" would 
constitute further evidence of the FCPA's impact. 10° Finally, the 1981 
Comptroller General report indicated that the airline industry was most 
(2000). 
94. James R. Hines, Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business After 
1977 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf. 
95. !d. at 6. Hines used data from Business International, which has since become pari of 
the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
96. !d. 
97. !d. at 11. 
98. !d. at 14. 
99. Jd. 
100. !d. 
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likely to be impacted negatively by the FCP A because of the unique 
prevalence of bribes. 101 Thus, Hines concluded that a drop in U.S. 
aircraft exports after 1977, when controlling for other variables, was 
likely due to the FCPA. 102 Although prior studies had suggested that the 
FCPA had no measurable impact on foreign investment, 103 Hines 
moved beyond prior scholarship b~ distinguishing the impact of the 
FCP A from other unrelated factors. 1 
He found that by each of these measures, U.S. business activity in 
corrupt countries showed ''unusual declines" after 1977. 105 Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) grew substantially more rapidly after 1977 in 
less-corrupt countries than in more corrupt countries, after controlling 
for GDP growth and total FDI. 106 Similarly, the median capital-to-labor 
ratio for corrupt high-growth countries fell slightly in the years after the 
FCPA, whereas it rose in less-corrupt countries. 107 With respect to 
aircraft exports, while the U.S. share ofthe world's exports declined in 
the years following the FCP A, it declined much more significantly, 
almost four times as much, in corrupt countries relative to less-corrupt 
countries. 108 
Hines noted that while U.S. commercial engagement in corrupt 
countries dropped significantly as a result of the FCP A, no evidence 
exists to suggest that total foreign business activity in such countries 
dropped; rather, other firms that were not constrained by anti-bribery 
legislation ~parently took the place once occupied by U.S. 
companies. 10 He noted that the principal effect of the statute was to 
divert U.S. investments to less-corrupt countries, and in more-corrupt 
countries to effectively "encourag[ e] ownership substitution between 
[U.S.] and foreign investors."ll0 
Hines' analysis of the impact of anti-bribery legislation on investor 
countries was limited to the United States for the obvious reason that it 
was the only country with such legislation at the time of his study. Once 
101. /d. at 19 n.22. Indeed, the report's survey of250 flnns in the Fortune 1000 noted that 
30% of respondents reported a reduction in overseas business as a consequence of the FCP A, 
and in the airline and construction industries the figure is more than 50%. /d. 
102. /d. at 16-18. 
103. See, e.g., Paul J. Beck, Michael W. Maher & Adrian E. Tschoegl, The Impact of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcoN. 295, 301 
(1991); John L. Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A New Perspective, 15 J. INT'L 
Bus. STUD. 107-11 (1984). For Hines' critique of the previous methodologies, see Hines, supra 
note 94, at 19 n.23. 
I 04. Hines, supra note 94, at 2. 
105. Hines, supra note 94, at 1. 
106. Hines, supra note 94, at 10. 
107. Hines, supra note 94, at 12. 
108. Hines, supra note 94, at 17. 
109. Hines, supra note 94, at 19-20. 
110. Hines, supra note 94, at 20. 
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that changed with ratification of the OECD convention, a new data set 
became available, and this data was analyzed for similar trends by 
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, an M.I.T.-trained economist at the Darla 
Moore School of Business at the University of South Carolina. In his 
first article on the subject, Cuervo-Cazurra essentially confirmed and 
expanded upon Hines' thesis. 111 Cuervo-Cazurra' s study was narrower 
than Hines' in that he focused exclusively on FDI, but broader in that 
Cuervo-Cazurra used data on bilateral FDI inflows from 183 home 
economies to 106 host economies with varying quantified corruption 
levels. 112 
Cuervo-Cazurra found that the phenomenon of businesses from 
countries with anti-bribery legislation investing less in highly corrupt 
countries was not limited to the United States. Rather, high levels of 
corruption in a host country generallj resulted in less FDI from 
signatories to the OECD convention. 11 The same phenomenon that 
Hines identified with respect to the United States thus became more 
widespread as a result of the OECD convention. The underside of the 
phenomenon that Hines first identified--countries that are not bound by 
anti-bribery legislation continue to invest in corrupt countries-was 
likewise confirmed by Cuervo-Cazurra. Post-OECD, as signatory 
countries invested less in corrupt countries, countries with higher levels 
of corruption received relatively more FDI from countries with similarly 
higher corruption levels. 114 The result of these trends is that as anti-
bribery legislation became more widespread, corrupt countries received 
less of their FDI from less-corrupt countries and more of their FDI from 
more-corrupt countries. 115 
Cuervo-Cazurra further expanded this analysis in a follow-up article 
published in 2008,116 which had two major conclusions concerning the 
impact of anti-bribery legislation on levels of FDI in relatively corrupt 
markets. First, he was able to verify and restate the conclusion of his 
previous article-that countries that implemented the OECD convention 
had become "more sensitive" to corruption and had reduced their FDI in 
more-corrupt countries. 117 Second, he proposed a modification of 
111. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 814. Cuervo-Cazurra further noted that 
Hines' study had become subject to various methodological disputes, as noted in Shang-Jin Wei, 
How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?, 82 REv. EcoN. & STAT. l (2000). 
Cuervo-Cazurra believed that he had improved upon Hines' methodology and yet confirmed the 
results. See Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 808-09. Again, evaluating these 
methodologies is not the purpose of this Article. 
112. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 811. 
113. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 807-08. 
114. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 808. 
115. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 808. 
116. Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws, supra note 15. 
117. Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws, supra note 15, at 644. 
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Hines' original thesis. He concluded that prior to the OECD convention, 
U.S. investors were not in fact investing less in corrupt countries, but 
that they began investing less after the ratification of the OECD.118 In 
other words, the FCPA standing alone did not induce U.S. investors to 
invest less in corrupt countries, but rather the OECD induced both U.S. 
and other OECD signatories to invest less. 
Whether Cuervo-Cazurra's methodology is more reliable than 
Hines' in evaluating the impact of the FCPA prior to the OECD 
convention is a question beyond the scope of this Article. The relevant 
conclusion from these studies is that the latest empirical studies suggest 
that anti-bribery legislation has a deterrent effect on investment in 
countries where bribery is perceived to be more prevalent. Moreover, 
countries that are more tolerant of corruption fill the FDI void. As the 
following section will show, the patterns of FCP A enforcement to date 
suggest that emerging markets are the countries where investment will 
be most deterred as a result of continued enforcement. 
C. The FCPA Enforcement Focus on Emerging Markets 
To identify the impact of the FCPA on emerging and frontier 
markets, I compiled a list of countries in which alleged acts of bribery 
formed the basis of either a finding of liability in a civil action, a 
conviction in a criminal action, or a settlement of either. Because these 
actions are frequently resolved through pleas, deferred prosecution 
agreements, or civil settlements, 119 one cannot claim that these instances 
of alleged bribery are proven. Because the defendant will sometimes 
settle without admitting guilt, they cannot even be called admitted 
violations. 120 Rather, they are allegations of bribery that ultimately 
formed the basis of the resolution of a legal action that is unfavorable to 
the defendant. For purposes of this analysis, they will be referred to as 
"alleged violations." 
Each country in which an alleged violation occurred over this thirty-
year period has been placed in one of the three categories suggested by 
the Standard & Poor's (S&P) typology: 1) developed markets (those 
more developed than the emerging markets); 2) emerging markets; and 
3) markets that have not yet become sufficiently attractive investment 
118. Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws, supra note 15, at 645. 
119. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 6 (2005); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of 
Authority: The Department of Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. l, l-
3 (2006). 
120. See FCPA DIGEST, supra note 8, at 11-201, for a breakdown of bribery-related FCPA 
cases by criminal action, civil action brought by the DOJ, and civil action brought by the SEC. 
Bribery-related charges might ultimately be settled either under the bribery provisions or the 
books and records provisions of the FCP A. See id 
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destinations to the international business and finance community to 
have made the S&P list of emerging markets (hereinafter "less 
developed markets"). 121 In total, there were 125 alleged violations-that 
is, 125 separate instances in which a defendant (or group of related 
defendants) became liable for one or more illicit payments in a 
particular country related to a single commercial transaction or a set of 
closely related transactions. 
Of these 125 instances, it is perhaps predictable that only nine, or 7% 
of the total, occurred in developed countries. Of those nine, only five 
have occurred since ratification of the OECD convention. Accordingly, 
very little FCP A enforcement activity occurs in developed countries. 
Outliers on the other end of the spectrum are those violations that 
occurred in countries that are not yet far enough along in their 
development to be included among the emerging markets. These 
amounted to thirty-one, or 25% of the totaL Of the thirty-one, nine 
occurred in Iraq as part of the United Nations' oil-for-food program. 
The remaining twenty-two instances occurred in eighteen different 
countries-in over thirty years of FCP A enforcement, only four such 
countries have been host to more than one FCP A violation. 
Accordingly, these enforcement actions are predictably diffuse and 
sporadic_ Combining this group with the few alleged violations that 
have occurred in developed countries results in a total of 32%-just less 
than one-third of all enforcement actions have occurred in nations 
either too developed, or not developed enough, to create a significant 
deterrent to investment. However, over two-thirds of all alleged 
violations-eighty-five instances, or 68% of the total-have occurred in 
emerging markets, as defined today by S&P. 
Arguably, the patterns of enforcement in the first and third 
categories of markets-developed markets, and less developed 
markets-do not raise substantial public policy concerns. Developed 
countries, while unquestionably wrestling with public corruption 
problems of their own, generally have relatively lower levels of 
tolerance of public corruption. The most commonly cited gauge of 
public corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which the 
non-profit organization Transparency International sponsors. Based on 
surveys of various practitioners, the CPI assigns a ranking to 180 
countries. 122 Using the 2008 rankings, 123 the developed countries in 
121. The categorizations of various countries, and the number of alleged violations that 
occurred in each, are provided in the APPENDIX. 
122. For a discussion of the CPI methodology, see Transparency International: The 
Global Coalition Against Corruption, TI Corruption Perceptions Index, 
http://www. transparency.org/policy _research/surveys _indices/cpi. 
123. Transparency International: The Global Coalition Against Corruption, TI Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2008, available at http://www.transparency.org/policy _research!surveys_ind 
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which FCP A violations have occurred have a mean CPI ranking of 
approximately 29 out of 180-they are among the least corrupt 
countries in the world. Given the low levels of corruption and of FCP A 
violations in these countries, any deterrent effect on future investment is 
likely to be minimal. 
At the other end of the spectrum are the countries whose levels of 
market development remain quite low. These less-developed markets 
are countries where there is a sufficiently high degree of volatility and a 
low degree of economic development, such that the finance community 
does not generally recommend investment. Unsurprisingly, the 
countries in this category that have been host to FCP A violations have a 
mean CPI ranking of 127 out of 180-among the most corrupt countries 
in the world. In contrast to the developed countries, here there is little 
investment and much corruption. In sum, these are countries with 
limited current prospects for economic growth, with very high levels of 
corruption, and with only sporadic foreign investment. Because these 
countries have not yet been able to create the conditions for larger-scale 
foreign investment, the aggregate economic impact of FCP A 
enforcement actions is far less problematic. 
However, the frequency of alleged violations in emerging markets, 
and the deterrent effect on these countries that will likely result, raises a 
major public policy red flag. These are markets where opportunities for 
exceptional economic development exist, where the prospects of 
overcoming poverty are historically high, and where the developed 
world is already investing in substantial and systematic ways. Many of 
these countries are in critical stages in their political development, and 
moreover, are likely instrumental in the stabilization of their geographic 
regions. China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Venezuela are a few 
examples of the countries in Standard & Poor's list of emerging markets 
where FCP A violations have already occurred and which have 
significant foreign policy implications. Finally, the mean CPI ranking of 
these countries is almost exactly the mean of all countries: 89 out of 
180. Corruption levels in these countries, while undeniably a cause for 
concern, are only average. 
In sum, both economically and politically, public policy would seem 
to strongly favor the building of economic ties in emerging markets. Yet 
these are the very countries in which most alleged violations occur. 
D. Putting the Pieces Together: Anti-Bribery Enforcement as De 
Facto Sanctions Against Emerging Markets 
To what extent does this pattern of enforcement constitute economic 
sanctions? Although HSEO do not count the FCP A or the OECD 
ices/cpi/2008 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). 
2010) ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION 377 
convention as sanctions, and lawyers, political scientists, and 
economists have not generally treated them as sanctions, the legislation 
exhibits almost all of the characteristics of sanctions_ They might rightly 
be counted as targeted sanctions-sanctions which target business that 
is obtained through the bribery of overseas officials. The list of targeted 
nations is open-ended, as they often are for targeted sanctions. We have 
seen that the markets that are most likely to fall into that open-ended 
category, and that raise the most formidable policy questions, are 
emerging markets. 
More specifically, consider the four elements of HSEO's 
definition-the "deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat 
of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations"124-in reverse 
order. Foreign direct investment certainly constitutes trade and financial 
relations. The levels of FDI that would exist absent the anti-corruption 
legislation are the "customary levels" that are withdrawn as a result of 
the legislation. Moreover, the threat of heightened FCP A enforcement, 
and the anticipation of more aggressive enforcement by OECD 
signatories, should now, after the work of Hines and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
constitute at least a tacit threat of further withdrawal. Because this 
withdrawal results from an act of government, it is "government-
inspired." They began as unilateral sanctions, but as often occurs, over 
time they became multilateral with the ratification of the OECD 
convention. These sanctions are not universally enforced, but then 
again, sanctions rarely are. 
Despite these parallels, it will be shown below that the FCP A fails 
quite conspicuously to meet the first of HSEO 's elements: the sanctions 
that result from the FCP A are not deliberate. That is, the United States 
did not intend to punish target countries by withdrawing customary 
trade and financial relations, either when it passed the FCP A or later 
when amending it. The FCP A thus resembles sanctions in every respect 
except, arguably, the most important one: no politically accountable 
governmental body ever decided to impose them. Part I of this Article 
explained that the statute, on its face, punishes suppliers of bribes only. 
The following exploration of the legislative history shows that this was 
precisely the purpose of the statute. It demonstrates that the FCP A was 
not to any meaningful degree an expression of disapproval of the 
governments that tolerate bribery. More to the point, the congressional 
testimony, like the statute, does not reflect an intent to punish those 
governments by withdrawing customary trade and financial relations. In 
this respect, and perhaps only in this respect, the consequences of FCP A 
enforcement are materially different from the targeted sanctions that 
have become so common in the post-Cold War era. 
124. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 3. 
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IV. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: BUILDING ALLIANCES THROUGH 
ETHICAL INVESTMENT 
Given the FCPA's straight-forward moral appeal and the context of 
the infamous Watergate scandal, the statute can lend itself to fairly 
simple assumptions about the values that motivated its passage. Relying 
on a general knowledge of the times and the structure and operation of 
the statute today, one can arrive at a number of incorrect conclusions 
about the zeitgeist of the time: that everyone believed in a universal 
ethical norm by which bribery was offensive; that immediate legislation 
was appropriate; that the legislation would ideally be multilateral, but if 
impossible, unilateral legislation was nonetheless called for; that the 
legislation should criminalize bribery; and that any negative impact to 
U.S. competitiveness would be easily outweighed by the moral and 
economic benefits of reducing bribery. 
The prevalence of this way of thinking is due in part to the failure of 
legal scholars thus far to more deeply mine the legislative history. This 
history reveals that among businessmen, financiers, academics, 
congressmen, presidential appointees, and U.S. Presidents, there was 
substantial disagreement on numerous fundamental issues, including: 
whether bribery was common overseas; whether bribery was necessary 
to conduct business there; whether companies from countries other than 
the United States engaged in bribery; whether the United States should 
work toward an international consensus and a multilateral treaty 
prohibiting bribery, or instead pass unilateral legislation; if the latter, 
whether it would impose a competitive disadvantage on U.S. 
businesses, have no impact, or actually improve their competitiveness; 
and whether any such legislation should criminalize bribery or merely 
impose civil penalties. The debate was surprisingly heated and 
contentious, peppered with dramatic rhetorical flourishes and poignant 
metaphors. 
The context of this debate creates a colorful backdrop, against which 
the underlying unanimity becomes all the more striking. On the more 
fundamental question of the legislation's purpose and its intended 
effects, every individual who testified clearly believed that the FCP A 
should encourage investment in higher risk countries to build economic 
and political alliances. The legislation would be an alliance-building 
tool. No one ever suggested, either in 1977 or in 1998, that the FCP A 
should punish countries that tolerate bribery by withdrawing economic 
support. Indeed, it should do precisely the opposite. Part IV.A paints the 
backdrop by sampling the more divided testimony. Against that 
backdrop, Part IV .B shows the breath of the consensus on the 
fundamental purpose of the legislation. Part IV.C further shows that in 
ratifying the OECD Convention and amending the FCPA in 1998, the 
United States continued to believe that the legislation should promote, 
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rather than deter, investment in countries that have historically 
presented higher bribery risks. 
A. The Early Disputes Over The Scope of the Problem and the 
Appropriate Remedy 
The earliest and most fundamental issue before Congress obviously 
was the magnitude of the overseas bribery problem-just how prevalent 
is bribery overseas, and how widely are U.S. businesses participating in 
it? This proved to be a topic of considerable disagreement. Many 
witnesses and documents admitted into the record suggested that the 
practice was nearly universal. In the course of the earliest hearings on 
the need for international anti-bribery legislation, Lockheed represented 
that bribes to overseas officials for business purposes had been made in 
"some countries ... for centuries-and was a practice we believe was 
engaged in by a great many companies, both American and foreign, 
including Lockheed."125 Its testimony went on to mention numerous 
other indicators that overseas bribery was widely practiced by 
businesses from many countries, and that it was known to exist by U.S. 
officials in both business and government. 126 
At least some of the media painted a similar picture. The prevalence 
of such payments was captured in a survey of Washington Post foreign 
correspondents published on June 22, 1975. Admitted into the 
congressional testimony, the survey reported that such payments "are 
ubiquitous and a way of life in many countries" and are "part of a 
deeply rooted system of doing business."127 Similarly, an interview by 
the Financial Times of the chairman of the U.S. Council of the 
International Chamber of Commerce suggested there are countries 
where, no matter the company's size, "you could not do business 
without greasing someone's palm."128 
Two U.S. Senators, in the course of the congressional hearings, 
powerfully voiced a similar perception of the prevalence of bribery in 
international business. Senator Abraham Ribicoff, a Democrat from 
Connecticut, stated: 
What disturbed me as I traveled around the world was the 
realization that American business was being 
internationally blamed for activities which are very obvious 
to me were a very common practice throughout the entire 
world. Not only the countries of the West-Western 
Europe, Japan, and the United States-but certainly 
125. 1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 26. 
126. 1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 27. 
127. 1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 26,57--60. 
128. 1975 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 26, at 50-51. 
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through Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. 129 
Similarly, Senator Frank Church, a Democrat from Idaho, 
concluded: "There is no doubt that these practices are common, and that 
they are used by foreign and American firms alike."130 This perception 
was further articulated by members of the administration of President 
Gerald Ford. RobertS. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, noted: "We 
are told that businessmen from other countries take the view that what 
we call improper payments are a basic requirement of the societies in 
which they operate, and represent centuries old practices which no 
amount of indignation or legislation can change." 131 
This view of the role of bribery in international business was 
expressed perhaps most poignantly in a September 21, 197 6, article in 
Foreign Affairs, which had been admitted into the record, in which the 
author tellingly explained: "The legend persists that the Harvard 
Business School student who questioned the ethics of this practice was 
directed by his professor to enroll in the Harvard Divinity School."132 
A very different perspective was articulated once President Jimmy 
Carter took office. The most forceful voice was that of George Ball, 
then of Lehman Bros., but formerly Undersecretary of State under 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Ball, who had become most famous 
for his opposition to the escalation of the Vietnam War, struck a far 
more moralistic tone. In response to American businessmen suggesting 
that bribery is pervasive and necessary, he said, "[ s ]uch self-righteous 
answers cannot stand analysis. That American business firms are 
compelled to engage in bribery is disproved by the example of a number 
of our most successful enterprises that rigorously reject such practices 
yet still do enormous business all over the world."133 
According to this worldview, the problem is not the absence of 
appropriate ethical standards abroad, but rather, of low standards in the 
United States. Dr. Gordon Adams, Director of the Military Research 
Council on Economic Priorities, a public interest research organization, 
129. Protecting the Ability of the United States to Trade Abroad: Hearing Before the. 
Subcomm. on International Trade of the S. Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) [hereinafter 
/975 Senate Hearing] (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff). 
130. !d. at 8 (statement of Sen. Frank Church). 
131. Abuses of Corporate Power: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and 
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Comm., 94th Cong. 153 (1976) [hereinafter 
1976 Joint Priorities Hearing]. 
132. Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Protection and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 126 
(1976) [hereinafter 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing]. 
133. Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 39 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Banking Hearings] 
(statement of George Ball, Lehman Bros). 
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observed that "the problem may not be one of lower standards abroad, 
but of low standards in general for U.S. corporate behavior."134 In a 
sharper retort to the previous testimony, he stated, "If anyone thinks that 
these standards are vastly different in other countries than they are in 
the United States, then that person must indeed be naive."135 
Relatedly, there was substantial disagreement on whether the United 
States should act unilaterally in prohibiting overseas bribery, or instead, 
seek to build an international agreement that would result in multilateral 
legislation. For example, Treasury Secretary Simon favored an 
international agreement with the United Nations (UN), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and OECD, 136 and was concerned that unilateral 
action by the United States might ''undercut the vital principle that 
cooperative action by the whole international communi~ of nations is 
needed in order to deal effectively with this problem."13 Likewise, Ian 
MacGregor, Chairman of the U.S. Council ofthe International Chamber 
of Commerce, testified that given the prevalence of bribery, "an 
international agreement on the legal definition for bribery and 
corruption might be needed before any general law and penalties could 
be drawn up to stop the practices," and urged the committee to delay 
unilateral legislation until the problem could be further studied and a 
more effective and fair remedy supplied. 138 
By contrast, Representative Stephen J. Solarz, a Democrat from New 
York and a member of the House International Relations Committee, 
believed that "any truly effective international agreement which 
provided enforcement procedures and sanctions would be a long time 
coming-if ever .... To wait until bribery is solved on a multilateral 
basis may well be to wait forever." 139 
The concern about unilateral action was based largely on the feared 
impact of such action on the competitiveness ofU.S. businesses. Robert 
S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, stated, "It is tempting to try to 
deal with the situation unilaterally, but there are serious risks for the 
United States in such an approach. There is widespread recognition in 
134. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 35 
(statement of Dr. Gordon Adams, Director of the Military Research Council on Economic 
Priorities). 
135. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 35 
(quoting Conference Board, an independent research organization, from The New York Times, 
Feb. 13, 1976). 
136. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 86 (statement of William E. Simon, 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
137. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 88. 
138. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 51-52 (statement of Ian 
MacGregor, Chairman of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce). 
139. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 142 
(statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz). 
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the Congress that such unilateral action would put U.S. companies at a 
serious disadvantage in the export trade."140 This fear was shared by the 
International Chamber of Commerce, which testified that unless 
prohibitions on overseas bribery were internationalized, it "could, and in 
some cases would, mitigate severely against U.S. business and prevent 
it from being able to compete effectively in quite substantial markets of 
the world."141 Senator Ribicoff predicted that under unilateral 
legislation, "the American companies, who should be making payoffs 
then would be barred from making payoffs, the business that they 
should be getting would be going to foreign competitors who were 
undertaking the same practices."142 
Then-Senator Joe Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, also agreed 
that frequently in international business, not just in the Lockheed 
instance but in many others, U.S. firms are competing only against 
fellow U.S. firms! 43 W. Michael Blumenthal, Treasury Secretary under 
President Carter, testified that paying bribes, "apart from being morally 
repugnant and illegal in most countries-is simply not necessary for the 
successful conduct of business here or overseas. I believe that the 
responsible elements of the business community agree."144 George Ball 
concurred, testifying that frequently, as in the case of Lockheed, the 
U.S. company is only competing against other U.S. companies. 145 He 
concluded: 
The only action that could materially reduce the practice-
and mitigate its consequences-is for the U.S. Government 
to utilize its powers as the domiciliary state of most of the 
largest multinational companies by enacting and enforcing 
comprehensive laws imposing on American corporations a 
standard of conduct in their overseas dealings fully as strict 
as that required at home. Only when that is done will our 
Government be able to speak with authority in shaping an 
international set of rules and sanctions. Having put our own 
house in order, we will be entitled to insist that foreign 
140. 1976 Joint Priorities Hearing, supra note 131, at 154 (statement of Hon. Robert S. 
Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State). 
141. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 49 (statement oflan MacGregor, 
Chairman of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce). 
142. 1975 Senate Hearing, supra note 129, at 1 (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff). 
143. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 44-45 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. 
Biden, Junior). 
144. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 67 (1977) 
[hereinafter 1977 Senate Banking Hearing] (statement ofW. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
145. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 39 (statement of George Ball, 
Lehman Bros.). 
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governments do likewise-and, in time this procedure 
should gradually bring some solid results. 146 
383 
Some, even of the business community, testified that anti-bribery 
legislation would actually improve the ability of U.S. companies to 
conduct business overseas. The Chairman of Gulf Oil Corporation 
urged Congress, 
[Y]ou ~an help us, and many other multinational 
corporations which are confronted by this problem by 
enacting legislation which would outlaw any foreign 
contribution by an American company. Such a statute on 
our books would make it easier to resist the very intense 
pressures which are placed upon us from time to time. 147 
Ultimately, both the House and Senate committee reports echoed this 
opinion. 148 Similarly, the SEC interpreted its data to suggest that the 
cessation of such foreign payments "will not serious~ affect the ability 
of American business to compete in world markets."1 
As with the question of whether bribery is prevalent internationally, 
there was some doubt as to whether any U.S. law should go so far as to 
criminalize such bribery, which the FCP A of course ultimately did. The 
Ford Administration was concerned that criminalization was both too 
severe and too difficult to implement. In President Ford's August 3, 
1976 Message from the President of the United States Urging 
Enactment of Proposed Legislation to Require the Disclosure of 
Payments to Foreign Officials, he urged passage of a bill that required 
reporting but did not criminalize payments, due to problems of 
"defmition and proof."150 
These competing worldviews, and the tensions among different 
witnesses and administrations, were illustrated in the following 
exchange. Frustrated by what he regarded as a tentative approach when 
146. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 40--41. 
147. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 141-42 
(statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz) (quoting Bob R. Dorsey, Chairman of Gulf Oil Corp.). 
148. See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4 (1977) ("Many U.S. firms have taken a strong stand 
against paying foreign bribes and are still able to compete in international trade."); H.R. REP. 
No. 95-640, at 5 (1977) (citing the testimony of SEC Chairman Roderick Hills that bribery is 
"unnecessary"). 
149. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., REPORT 
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE 
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 42-43 (Comm. Print 1976). 
150. FOREIGN PAYMENT DISCLOSURE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES URGING ENAClMENT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO REQUIRE THE DISCLOSURE OF 
PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS, H.R. Doc. No. 94-572, at I (1976) [hereinafter 1976 
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT URGING ENACTMENT]. 
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he felt that an immediate and fairly strong response was needed, Senator 
Proxmire said, 
I recall the story of an agency in the bureaucracy that was 
short on bureaucrats. They hired a talking parrot. And they 
made him a GS-15. They taught him to say only one 
phrase: 'Very complex, very complex.' Sometimes I get the 
feeling that that parrot, that very complex parrot, is in 
charge of the Federal Government's groping, grasping, 
policy on bribery. 151 
Elliot L. Richardson, President Ford's Secretary of Commerce, 
responded that the Ford Administration was developing numerous non-
criminalizing solutions, including information-sharing agreements, 
disclosure requirements, a code of conduct, and developing an 
international approach through the OECD and the UN. 152 Expressing 
reservations about criminalization, Richardson said, "Even a parrot 
must occasionally be right."153 Following Richardson, Ford's Treasury 
Secretary William E. Simon began his testimony, "The Treasury 
Department actually hired a second parrot, Mr. Chairman and he says, 'I 
agree, let's study it. "'154 
B. The Early Consensus: Anti-Bribery Legislation as an 
Alliance-Building Instrument 
There was one issue which no one apparently believed needed to be 
studied. Despite these contrasting viewpoints on crucial issues related to 
the nature of the problem and the appropriate remedy, an absolute 
consensus existed on the question of the purpose and intended effects of 
the proposed legislation. Bribery is a foreign policy problem because it 
jeopardizes our relations with countries whose alliances we very much 
value. Specifically, exposing the bribing of overseas officials 
undermines U.S. credibility and creates the conditions in which hostile 
governments can spread. Moreover, all agreed that these alliances must 
be maintained through the continued building of economic and political 
ties with vulnerable countries, and that the resulting legislation was 
therefore designed to promote investment in countries where bribery 
was occurring, rather than to withdraw investments as punishment. The 
legislative history reveals that this view was shared by the business 
151. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 76 (statement of Sen. William 
Proxmire). 
152. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 79 (statement of Elliot Richardson, 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce). 
153. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 80. 
154. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 84 (statement of William E. Simon, 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
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community as well as by every member of Congress who spoke. The bi-
partisan nature of this consensus is further apparent in the comments 
made by members of the Republican Ford Administration and the 
Democratic Carter Administration, whose comments were 
indistinguishable both in substance and tone. 
The most fulsome explanation of the foreign policy implications of 
international bribery was provided by Congressman Solarz. He began 
his testimony: "It is important to look at the problem of overseas 
payments in broader terms than simply a matter of economics or even 
morality."155 In doing so, Solarz articulated a view that would prove to 
be universal among witnesses that there existed another dimension to 
the problem of overseas bribery, and he used the example of Lockheed 
to illustrate this view. Solarz described that the Lockheed scandal, 
which involved payments to Japanese officials, put '"[t]he democratic 
system in Japan[] in grave danger."'156 Japanese opponents ofthe close 
ties between the United States and Japan were 
handed a terribly effective weapon to drive a wedge 
between two close allies. At a time of uncertainty due to the 
shifting balances of power in Asia, our strongest and most 
stable ally in the region [was] undergoing unnecessary 
turbulence, and [a] relationship which is at the ve~ heart of 
our foreign policy [was] potentially jeopardized.15 
Lockheed's payments had also occurred in the Netherlands, where 
Prince Bernhard reportedly received $1.1 million in bribes from 
Lockheed and was forced to resign. But, Solarz explained, "[p ]erhaps 
most serious" was the "delicate situation" with Italy, which was "one of 
the keys to the southern flank of NAT0."158 He explained that the 
power struggle between Italy's more democratic party-the Christian 
Democrats-and the Communist Party was at that time quite 
pronounced, and the balance was precarious. He noted that 
"[a]llegations of payments by Lockheed served to advance the 
Communist cause in Italy where the Communist bloc was strengthened 
by the sight of corrupt capitalism."159 His ultimate fear was that the 
155. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 140 
(statement of Rep. StephenS. Solarz). 
156. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Protection and Finance of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th 
Cong. 172 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Protection Hearings] (statement of Rep. StephenS. Solarz) 
(quoting "a very senior politician close to former [Japanese] Prime Minister Takeo Mike"). 
157. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 141 
(statement of Rep. StephenS. Solarz). 
158. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 141. 
159. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen S. 
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Communist Party would gain a majori~ in the Italian parliament and 
the country would be lost to the enemy. 1 0 
He concluded that the foreign policy implications for the United 
States were "staggering and in some cases, perhaps irreversible."161 U.S. 
foreign policy objectives are "seriously impaired" when "foreign 
government is weakened by corruption because popular support erodes 
thus jeopardizing common interests shared with our friends 
overseas. "
162 The example of Italy demonstrated that "( c ]ommunist and 
other anti-U.S. forces are quick to take advantage of any evidence of 
immorality or corruption associated with pro-Western governments. 
Both fear and resentment are generated among foreign officials who 
become increasingly hostile as the United States continues to expose 
traditional corrupt practices abroad."163 He continued, "The resulting 
economic and political instability is certainly detrimental to American 
foreign policy especially when it results in a backlash against American 
ideals and interests."164 Ultimately, he observed, "[W]hat is at stake is 
much more than the individual interests of corporations which are 
competing for a share of foreign markets. What is in fact at stake is the 
foreign policy and national interest of the Untied [sic] States."165 
This view would be powerfully expressed by members of both the 
Ford and Carter Administrations. Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal 
Adviser in the Department of State under President Ford, testified that 
Solarz). 
[ c ]orruption weakens the fabric of government, erodes 
popular support, and jeopardizes the important interests we 
share with our friends abroad. The free enterprise system is 
a vital factor in world economic growth upon which social 
progress, economic justice, and perhaps, ultimately, world 
peace depends. . . . Corruption of friendly foreign 
governments can undermine the most important objectives 
of our foreign policy. 166 
160. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 141 
(statement of Rep. StephenS. Solarz). 
161. 1976 House Consumer Protection Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 132, at 2 
(statement of John M. Murphy, Chairman). 
162. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen S. 
Solarz). 
163. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173. 
164. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173. 
165. 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 156, at 173. 
166. The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 94th 
Cong. 23-24 (1975) (statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of 
State). 
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Similarly, Ford's Deputy Secretary of State, Robert S. Ingersoll, 
stated: 
I wish to state for the record that grievous damage has been 
done to the foreign relations of the United States by recent 
disclosures .... [I]t is a fact that public discussion in this 
country of the alleged misdeeds of officials of foreign 
governments cannot fail to damage our relations with these 
governments. 167 
Treasury Secretary William E. Simon further stated that it "erodes 
the general reputation of the American business community, may 
adversely affect our relations with foreign governments and can 
contribute to a general deterioration in the climate for fair and open 
international trade and investment."168 It is notable that this concern was 
voiced by members of both parties. Indeed, it was voiced by both 
presidential administrations. Ford's Commerce Secretary, Elliot L. 
Richardson, further articulated: "Bribery corrodes the confidence that 
must exist between buyer and seller if domestic and international 
commerce is to flourish. It threatens to poison relationships between the 
United States and nations with which we have long had mutually 
beneficial political and commercial ties."169 
In urging passage of legislation, President Ford stated that reports of 
bribery "have resulted in an erosion of confidence in the responsibility 
of many of our important business enterprises. In a more general way, 
these disclosures tend to destroy confidence in our free enterprise 
institutions."170 He repeated the theme that bribery is first and foremost 
a problem of image and creates a crisis of confidence, rather than a 
problem of substantive ethics or economic efficiency and growth. 171 
The legislation would "contribute in an important way to the restoration 
of confidence in America's vital business institutions."172 
Unlike their arguments on other issues, which marked a sharp 
departure from the prior administration, the comments coming from the 
Carter Administration were indistinguishable from those of its 
predecessor. Carter's Treasury Secretary, W. Michael Blumenthal, 
stated, "The Carter Administration believes that it is damaging both to 
our country and to a healthy world economic system for American 
167. 1976 Joint Priorities Hearing, supra note 131, at 154 (statement of Hon. RobertS. 
Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary ofthe U.S. Department of State). 
168. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 85 (statement of William E. Simon, 
Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
169. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 76. 
170. 1976 PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT URGING ENACTMENT, supra note 150, at 1. 
171. 1976 PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT URGING ENACTMENT, supra note 150, at 3. 
172. 1976 PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT URGING ENACTMENT, supra note 150, at 3. 
388 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
corporations to bribe foreign officials."173 President Carter ultimately 
explained in his signing statement that 
[ d]uring my campaign for the Presidency, I repeatedly 
stressed the need for tough legislation to prohibit corporate 
bribery. [The FCP A] provides that necessary sanction. I 
share Congress belief that bribery is ethically repugnant 
and competitively unnecessary. Corrupt practices between 
corporations and public officials overseas undermine the 
integrity and stability of governments and harm our 
relations with other countries. Recent revelations of 
widespread overseas bribery have eroded public confidence 
in our basic institutions. 174 
Again, this view was expressed most forcefully and eloquently by 
the Democrat George Ball: 
The vast volume of speeches, pamphlets, and advertising 
copy and propaganda leaflets extolling the virtues of free 
enterprise are cancelled every night when managements 
demonstrate by their conduct that a sector of multinational 
business activity is not free; it is bought and paid for. This 
is a problem that, like so many others, has relevance in the 
struggle of antagonistic ideologies; for, when our 
enterprises stoop to bribery and kickbacks, they give 
substance to the communist myth-already widely believed 
in Third World countries-that capitalism is fundamentally 
corrupt. 175 
Thus, even most liberal, reform-minded advocates recognized 
the urgent foreign policy implications. 
The congressional reports captured this important basis for the 
legislation. The Senate Report stated that as "[t]he image of American 
democracy abroad has been tarnished ... [ c ]onfidence in the financial 
integrity of our corporations has been impaired."176 Governments that 
otherwise had friendly relations with the United States, such as Japan, 
Italy, and the Netherlands, came under "intense pressure from their own 
people."177 The idea gained its most fulsome expression in the House 
173. 1977 Senate Banking Hearing, supra note 144, at 67 (statement of W. Michael 
Blumenthal, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
174. Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill: Statement on Signing S. 
305 into Law, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1909, 1909 (Dec. 20, 1977). 
175. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 41-42 (statement of George Ball, 
Lehman Bros.). 
176. S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3 ( 1977). 
177. /d. 
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Report, which discussed the ethical component of the bribery 
problem, 178 and that bribery is not only unethical, but is "bad business 
as well."179 It mentioned that bribery "short-circuits the marketplace" by 
channeling business to companies that are "too inefficient" or "too lazy" 
to compete fairly. 180 Bribery "rewards corruption instead of efficiencs-1 
and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards."1 1 
Despite these themes of ethics and efficiency, the overriding concern 
expressed in the House Report was with America's international 
image- "It erodes public confidence in the integrity of the free market 
system."182 And the corrupt practices of some U.S. companies "casts a 
shadow on all U.S. companies."183 It also noted that "the exposure of 
such activity can damage a company's image," while secondarily 
mentioning that it can cause direct financial damage. 184 
The House Report further sounded the theme of the foreign policy 
implications of overseas bribery. Bribery creates "severe foreign policy 
problems" for the United States. 185 The Lockheed scandal, for instance, 
"shook the Government of Japan to its political foundation and gave 
opponents of close ties between the United States and Japan an effective 
weapon with which to drive a wedge between the two nations."186 
Similarly, when it was revealed that multiple large oil companies bribed 
Italian officials, it "eroded public support for that Government and 
jeopardized U.S. foreign policy" with Italy, the broader Mediterranean 
area, and "with respect to the entire NATO alliance."187 Ultimately, 
bribery can "embarrass friendly governments, lower the esteem for the 
United States among the citizens of foreign nations, and lend credence 
to the suspicions sown by foreign opponents of the United States that 
American enterprises exert a corrupting influence on the political 
processes of their nations."188 These comments, again, assume that 
bribery is incongruent with the cultural norms of the payee's country, 
and that its exposure sparks public outrage. 
The foreign policy implications of bribery were perhaps stated most 
graphically, and somewhat comically, in the following exchange. The 
executive of a company that was known to have bribed overseas 
officials in a European country testified, somewhat incredibly, that 
178. H. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977). 
179. !d. 
180. !d. 
181. !d. at4-5. 
182. Id. at 4. 
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although his company had in fact paid bribes to leaders of Eastern 
European countries, the purpose of its work was to promote liberal free 
enterprise and stave off communism, which required bribing political 
parties. 189 Then-Senator Joe Biden, sitting on the committee, facetiously 
asked, "How much did you contribute to the Communist Party?" 
Perhaps not appreciating the Senator's tone, the attorney turned to the 
president of the corporation, conferred for a moment, and replied, 
"Well, $88,000."190 
The foreign policy implications of bribery were unmistakable. But 
also unmistakable was the precise design of the intended remedy: 
continued investment, albeit subject to higher ethical standards. In the 
ensuing twenty years, the United States would realize that the PCP A 
was in fact restricting such investment by U.S. companies, and that this 
constituted a serious shortfall of the legislation. In 1998, Congress 
would undertake to correct that problem and create the conditions under 
which U.S. businesses would again be free to invest liberally in 
transitional economies. 
C. Affirming the Consensus in Amending the FCPA Twenty Years 
Later 
As explained in Part II, although the PCP A was amended in 1988 in 
several respects, this occurred as part of an omnibus bill, with minimal 
congressional testimony on the nature and purpose of anti-bribery 
legislation. Despite the legislative vehicle for these amendments, the 
1988 Amendments would prove most significant in their requirement 
that the President pursue the negotiation of an international agreement 
with the member countries of the OECD to govern acts prohibited by 
the PCPA. 191 
This requirement was ultimately satisfied on December 17, 1997, 
with the OECD Member States' adoption of the Convention on 
Combating Bribery. 192 The convention required each state to adopt its 
own legislation to enact its provisions into law and provide for its 
enforcement, 193 and the United States did so on December 8, 1998. 
While the convention does not require absolute identity among the 
statutes passed by the various states, it does require functional 
189. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 45 (statement of Sen. Joseph R. 
Biden, Junior). 
190. /d. 
191. H.R. REP. No. 100-576, 924 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1547, 1957. 
192. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1. 
193. /d. 
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equivalence, 194 and this in turn required amendments to the FCP A. 
The U.S. ratification of the convention began with the May 4, 1998 
message from President Clinton transmitting the OECD convention. 
The message referenced only a single policy behind ratifying the treaty: 
Since the enactment ... of [the FCPA], the United States 
has been alone in specifically criminalizing the business-
related bribery of foreign public officials. United States 
corporations have contended that this has put them at a 
significant disadvantage in competing for international 
contracts with respect to foreign competitors who are not 
subject to such laws. 195 
The President advocated ratification of the treaty because it would 
facilitate U.S. investment in countries where the FCPA had previously 
put U.S. businesses at a disadvantage. 
The theme would prove fundamental in the ensuing congressional 
testimony, and was frequently captured with the same ubiquitous 
metaphor. In the hearings before the House Commerce Committee's 
Subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous Materials, Congressman 
Michael Oxley, a Republican from Ohio, stated that the convention 
would "go a long way to leveling the playing field."196 Congressman 
Bliley reiterated the theme of fighting bribery by "level[ing] the playing 
field,"197 as would Associate Director of Enforcement for the S.E.C. 
Paul V. Gerlach. 198 The metaphor eventually made its way into the 
presidential signing statement, wherein President Clinton explained that 
"U.S. companies have had to compete on an uneven playing field, 
resultinij in losses of international contracts estimated at $30 billion per 
year."19 
The overwhelming concern among congressional leaders and 
witnesses, as well as the President, in ratifying the OECD treaty was 
enabling U.S. businesses to compete with companies from countries that 
had not previously ratified or enforced anti-bribery legislation. The 
predictions of some in the original hearings that the FCP A would not 
adversely affect U.S. competitiveness had, by all accounts, proven 
194. See ZARIN, supra note 18, at§ 13:3. 
195. S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, at III (1998). 
196. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of /998: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 1 
(1998) [hereinafter 1998 House Finance Hearing] (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley). 
197. /d. at 4 (statement of Rep. Tom Biiley). 
198. /d. at 11 (statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director of Enforcement of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission). 
199. Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 
1998, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2290, 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998), reprinted in 1998 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 771, 771 [hereinafter 1998 Presidential Signing Statement]. 
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wrong, and the inability of U.S. companies to continue investing in 
historically higher risk countries had become a major public policy 
concern. This theme proved so dominant that many of the other issues 
that had appeared in the testimony in the 1970s had, by 1998, 
disappeared. Among the vanished themes was the damage that bribery 
did to U.S. foreign policy interests. This disappearance was likely due 
largely to two factors: the collapse of the Soviet Union, which brought 
an end to bi-polar international politics, and the success of the FCP A in 
curbing bribery, which at least in part brought an end to the major 
overseas bribery scandals such as Lockheed's. 
But despite the absence of overt foreign policy themes in the 1998 
testimony, from the concept of leveling the playing field there generally 
emerged three more subtle, but unmistakably present, themes that bear 
on the question of the FCPA's intended effect on international relations. 
Each is consistent with the 1977 view of the FCP A. 
First and perhaps most obviously, it remained true that the 
legislation would, and should, target only the suppliers of the bribes, 
and not the solicitors, recipients, or the governments that tolerate them. 
Congressman Edward J. Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts, 
submitted a prepared opening statement which explained that in 
originally passing the FCP A, "it was hoped that by taking the lead to 
curb bribery by our corporations, America would put pressure on the 
other developed industrialized nations to adopt similar laws. "200 
Congressman Oxley testified that the problem which the OECD 
convention was designed to remedy "is that our competitors have much 
looser rules and enforcement mechanisms against bribery."201 
Congressman Thomas Manton, Democrat from New York, expressed 
the problem was not merely with the absence of fear of penalty, as 
certain trading partners, such as Germany, apparentl~ "appear to 
actually encourage [bribery] through their tax codes."2 2 The House 
Report ultimately noted that since 1977, U.S. businesses have "operated 
at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors who have continued to 
pay bribes without fear of penalty. "203 The report stated that the OECD 
treaty will, in relation to the FCP A, achieve "comparable prohibitions in 
other developed countries."204 The object of the legislation, then as 
before, was to punish the supply of bribes, and not the demand. The 
200. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 5 (statement of Rep. Edward J. 
Markey). 
201. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 1 (statement of Rep. Michael G. 
Oxley). 
202. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 3 (statement of Rep. Thomas J. 
Manton). 
203. H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 10 (1998). 
204. /d. 
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convention was going after bribery suppliers in developed markets, and 
not solicitors, recipients, or the governments of emerging markets. 
Second, and nearly as obvious, in "leveling the playing field," the 
objective was to encourage U.S. investment in those markets where the 
FCP A had served to inhibit it. Undersecretary of State Stuart Eisenstat 
testified that lost business to the United States, as a result of the FCP A, 
was approximately $30 billion per year,205 and that the OECD would 
have covered about 70% of those deals. 206 His concern was that the 
United States was being denied investment opportunities because of this 
legislation. Congressman Oxley explained that the OECD would again 
enable that investment: 
American business and American workers, the most 
productive in the world, are prime beneficiaries of free and 
open markets overseas. But to take advantage of the 
benefits of free trade, the business victory has to go to the 
best competitor .... Transparency and openness are keys to 
free competition. The more fair the competitive 
environment, the better our companies will do. 207 
The inability of U.S. businesses to invest in historically higher risk 
countries was precisely the problem which the 1988 amendments had 
directed the President to remedy, and which were in fact remedied by 
the adoption of the convention. 
Third, the theme of how to effectively bring about host-country 
reforms appears in the testimony in ways that, albeit still faint, are 
unmistakably present. The few who hinted at the mechanism by which 
the OECD would effect these reforms suggested, although admittedly 
not overwhelmingly, that it should be heightened investment, not 
withdrawal. Two congressmen alluded to the possibilities of reform. 
Congressman Manton explained that bribery's "detrimental effect on 
economies and societies is evident. Corruption distorts the allocation of 
resources, undermines fair competition in the marketplace, hurts 
economic development, erodes confidence in political systems and 
fosters organized crime."208 Drawing on recent economic events, 
Congressman Oxley explained that U.S. investment in developing 
countries is 
205. H.R. REP. No. 43, at 45 (1998) (statement of Stuart E. Eizenstat, Undersecretary of the 
U.S. Department of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs). 
206. Id. at 61. 
207. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Michael G. 
Oxley). 
208. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 3 (statement of Rep. Thomas J. 
Manton). 
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better for the countries involved. Recent events in Asia 
show us that a lack of transparency can lead to market 
distortions and inefficiencies with negative results for 
national economies and individual citizens. This 
Convention will not end bribery worldwide, and I think we 
all understand that, but it is an important step forward in 
America's effort to lead the world to a more open, market-
based system. 209 
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Congressman Oxley thus suggested, albeit in passing, that reforms in 
higher risk countries were perhaps one eventual result of the legislation, 
and that such reforms would occur as a result of investment rather than 
withdrawal. Similarly, the House Commerce Committee Report stated 
that the goal of the United States in ratifying the OECD was to promote 
"stronger, more reliable, and transparent foreign legal regimes that, in 
tum, make for more reliable and attractive investment climates.'mo The 
House Report characterizes the harm that comes to payee countries in 
terms of economic efficiency, rather than ethics, and as two-fold. First, 
the quality of the products and services to be provided by the payor 
diminishes, in that countries that receive bribes may grant contracts to 
businesses "offering an inferior deal.''211 Second, it suggests that the 
perception that bribery is necessary in a country to do business in effect 
deters investment, in that "countries that have the most corruption have 
trouble attracting foreign investment because the need to bribe acts as a 
substantial added tax on the investor."212 While none of these comments 
expressly reference the intended mechanism of effecting reforms-
whether it should be investment or withdrawal-both Congressmen 
Oxley and Manton, as well as the House Report, had already amply 
expressed their intention that the statute should promote investment. 
The theme would become slightly more apparent in the testimony of 
the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, Andrew Pincus. 
He testified that 
Implementation of this treaty around the world is absolutely 
vital to the promotion of our democratic ideals. Corruption 
is completely inconsistent with free trade and fair 
government, and implementation of this treaty is also vital 
to the ability of American companies to compete in the 
global economy. The unfortunate reality is that last year we 
estimate $30 billion in international contracts were alleged 
209. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 2 (statement of Rep. Michael G. 
Oxley). 
210. H.R. REP. No. 105-802, at 10 (1998). 
211. /d. 
212. /d. 
2010) ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION 395 
to involve bribery by foreign firms.213 
Pincus did not seem to imagine that further losses to investors of the 
developed world would be the impetus to reform. Rather, in remedying 
the problem of lost U.S. business opportunities, both the United States 
and the OECD signatories would take advantage of those opportunities 
through continued investment, and that reforms would occur as a result. 
Similarly, President Clinton's signing statement provided, "The 
United States has led the effort to curb international bribery. We have 
long believed bribery is inconsistent with democratic values, such as 
good governance and the rule of law. It is also contrary to basic 
principles of fair comP.etition and harmful to efforts to promote 
economic development."214 Although communism was no longer the 
enemy, it was nonetheless envisioned that liberal reforms could, over 
time, occur if the developed world prohibited bribery and yet continued 
to actively invest in countries that were historically higher-risk. Thus, 
host-country reform was clearly secondary in importance in 1998, 
subsumed under the imperative of promoting U.S. investment. But to 
the extent that it was addressed, all parties suggested that greater 
transparency, productivity, and efficiency could be obtained by 
encouraging investment in countries where the U.S. businesses had been 
hamstrung by the FCP A in relation to companies from other countries. 
No one suggested that withdrawal was intended, foreseeable, or 
effective. Therefore, the purpose of leveling the playing field, then, was 
to get the United States back in the game. 
And the game, it might be said, was to actively and competitively 
invest in those countries that presented substantial economic 
opportunities, but where bribery remained enough of a problem that 
countries not previously bound by anti-bribery legislation had competed 
with an advantage over U.S. companies. Generally speaking, these 
would be the emerging markets. The goal of the 1998 amendments was 
thus to enable U.S. investment in such markets. 
If economic withdrawal were the objective, anti-competitiveness 
would not be a concem-policyrnakers would expressly intend that U.S. 
businesses continue to not invest in higher risk countries, regardless of 
what other developed-country competitors might be doing. But this was 
never suggested. The unmistakable intention was to promote continued 
investment in countries where bribery occurred. Neither was it ever 
suggested that countries that tolerate bribery should be held responsible 
for the prevalence of bribery and punished through economic 
withdrawal. To the contrary, the general view was that reforms might 
213. 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 196, at 6 (statement of Andrew J. Pincus, 
General Counsel to the U.S. Department of Commerce). 
214. 1998 Presidential Signing Statement, supra note 199, at 2290. 
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incrementally occur through continued investment by companies from 
less corrupt countries. No one, not a single witness, suggested that it 
would be appropriate, let alone effective, to withdraw economic support 
from countries that neglected to crack down on bribery. The concept is 
simply not present in the legislative history, just as it is not manifest in 
the statutory text. Rather, the purpose was to underscore that anti-
bribery legislation resembles economic sanctions in every respect 
except arguably the most important one, as there is no congressional 
testimony showing that anyone ever intended it to function this way. 
The FCPA, and its progeny, thus constitute a unique kind of economic 
sanction: they sanction host countries despite the intentions of anyone 
who ever testified on the matter. 
V. THE CONUNDRUM OF UNWITIING SANCTIONS 
Given this legislative history, the FCP A is disqualified from one of 
the two recognized purposes of sanctions. It cannot be thought of, even 
with a caveat, as expressive sanctions, for the obvious reason that the 
United States never expressed a desire to impose them. They are, then, 
unwitting sanctions; de facto, and not de jure. To the extent that the 
withdrawal of these customary trade and financial relations has any 
value at all, it must be of instrumental value-the capacity to effect 
reforms in target countries. However, thinking of anti-bribery 
legislation as unwitting instrumental sanctions against emerging 
markets proves deeply problematic. Specifically, it presents two distinct 
sets of problems: the first concerns the actual effects of the legislation's 
enforcement, and the second concerns whether those effects are 
justifiable as a matter of public policy. 
A. The Likely Effects of the Present Enforcement Regime 
If current enforcement trends continue, any of three aggregate 
outcomes might result, none of which is satisfactory. The first is that 
targeted countries will respond to the economic withdrawal by 
implementing domestic reforms. While this might be the most desirable 
outcome, it is certainly not the most likely. Indeed, economic sanctions 
literature casts substantial doubt on whether this can ever be a realistic 
foreign policy goal: it is at best uncertain whether these sanctions can 
succeed in effecting reforms in emerging markets. As explained above, 
economists and political scientists have demonstrated that whether 
sanctions are likely to prove effective is a complex analysis. Among the 
political goals that bear the most relevance to anti-corruption legislation 
include the extent of international cooperation in enforcing the 
sanctions; whether both the senders and targets are members of the 
international organization that is coordinating the administration of the 
sanctions; the "warmth" of prior relations between senders and targets; 
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and the political s5stem of the target nations, ranging between autocratic 
and democratic.Z1 Economic variables include the costs imposed on the 
target countries; the costs to the sender countries; prior commercial 
relations between senders and targets; the relative economic size of the 
targets and senders; and the economic health and political stability of 
the targets.216 Effectiveness thus depends on myriad political and 
economic factors, the combination of which is specific to each country. 
However, the FCP A has been enforced, and will continue to be 
enforced, against a very broad and open-ended swath of countries, with 
widely-varying political and economic conditions. Determining which 
of these countries are most likely to respond to enforcement by cracking 
down on bribery would be a very detailed and time-consuming analysis, 
even if the DOJ and SEC were inclined to conduct it. 
The second scenario, while perhaps less hopeful, is certainly more 
realistic, as the empirical evidence demonstrates that it has already 
begun to occur.217 As investment opportunities continue to develop in 
higher-risk countries, at least some capital-rich countries may neglect, 
or even refuse, to ratify and enforce anti-bribery legislation. In sanctions 
terminology, these "black knights" will move in to fill the void created 
by the economic withdrawal of countries that are enforcing the OECD 
convention. Companies from countries that either have not ratified the 
OECD convention or do not enforce it, such as China or Russia, may 
not hesitate to invest in these countries. Cuervo-Cazurro in 2006 found 
this precise dynamic to be occurring, observing that "[ c ]orruption in the 
host country results in relatively less FDI from countries that have 
signed the OECD Convention, but [results] in relatively more FDI from 
countries with high levels of corruption."218 More recently, China's 
systematic investment in emerging economies in Africa, Central Asia, 
and Latin America, where CPI corruption levels remain relatively high, 
provides further evidence in support of these findings.219 If this dynamic 
continues, companies from those countries that actively enforce anti-
215. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 55. 
216. HOFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 55. 
217. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 809; Hines, supra note 94, at 19-20 
(finding that the FCPA encouraged "ownership substitution" between U.S. investors, who were 
at that time the only investors subject to anti-bribery legislation, and foreign investors). 
218. Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares, supra note 15, at 808. 
219. For recent academic commentary on China's ascendancy in Africa, see, for example. 
Hany Besada, The Implications of China's Ascendancy for Africa 1-37 (The Ctr. for Int'l 
Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=1289787; Gemot Pehnelt, The Political Economy of China's Aid Policy 
in Africa (Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-051, Aug. 22, 2007), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=1022868; Jian-Ye Wang, What Drives China's Growing Role in 
Africa? 1-30 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 07/211, 2007), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=1012994. 
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bribery legislation will tend to seek out safer investment destinations, 
which will typically exist in more developed markets. The nations of the 
developed world will begin to invest in each other, while the less-
developed economies with less-developed anti-bribery regimes will do 
the same. The world economy could slowly begin to bifurcate into two 
economies: one in which bribery is tolerated and one in which it is not. 
To see this scenario play out, even if only partially, would raise 
innumerable problems in the ethical, economic, and foreign policy 
spheres alike. 
It is a regrettable irony that this may not even be the least desirable 
result of the present anti-bribery enforcement regime. The third 
conceivable outcome is that the developed nations will continue to 
incrementally withdraw from emerging markets, but the black knights 
will not substantially fill the void. In this scenario, the emerging 
markets' historic opportunities for growth, with its concomitant 
economic and social benefits, will be missed. Even if bribery is 
deterred, the OECD-enforcing nations will have prolonged the suffering 
of poorer but otherwise promising nations. This result, while consistent 
with a firm ethical commitment to reducing bribery, is ultimately 
nonetheless tragic.220 
B. Policy Problems Inherent in the Present Enforcement Regime 
Even if these de facto sanctions were likely to succeed in effecting 
reforms, it is by no means self-evident that continuing to implement 
them would be a desirable course of action. That is, it is not at all clear 
that the benefits would outweigh the costs. The preliminary data 
suggests the possibility of substantial collateral damage that virtually no 
one intended or foresaw: economic growth may be stunted in countries 
that otherwise enjoy historically rare opportunities to reduce poverty, 
and foreign policy alliances may be made or broken in critical and 
volatile areas of the world.221 
Reflecting on these potential effects exposes a fundamental, and 
quite difficult, policy trade-off: if forced to choose between reducing 
poverty and reducing corruption, which should we prefer? To the extent 
that enforcing anti-bribery legislation stymies economic development, 
and thus reducing poverty and reducing corruption are to some degree 
220. For discussions of the importance of foreign direct investment to economic 
development, see, for example, THEODORE MoRAN, EDWARD M. GRAHAM & MAGNUS 
BLOMSTROM EDS., DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INvEsTMENT PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT? (2005); 
THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE NEW POLICY 
AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 19-25 ( 1998). 
221. On the relation between foreign direct investment and U.S. Foreign Policy, see, for 
example, EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCIDCK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 95-121 (2006). 
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competing goals, which should be the higher, or more immediate, 
priority? 
The available data on the impact of anti-bribery enforcement 
supplies a preliminary answer to this question. In our enforcement of 
anti-bribery legislation, we have prioritized the reduction of bribery 
above the reduction of poverty. The work of Hines and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
combined with the data compiled in this Article about the market types 
where enforcement actions usually occur, lead inexorably to this 
conclusion: those nations that are actively participating in the 
enforcement of anti-bribery legislation are sacrificing, in significant 
part, the opportunity to reduce poverty in the name of combating 
bribery. 
We should take notice of this result. While there are at least two 
possible ways to justify it, neither is compelling. First, it might be said 
that combating bribery actually furthers economic development, thereby 
reducing poverty. By this line of reasoning, bribery and other forms of 
corruption are a detriment to economic efficiency, and reducing bribery 
will therefore promote efficiency and in tum promote economic 
development.222 This theory, as applied, proves problematic. For 
starters, emerging markets are by definition uniquely positioned at 
present to experience historic economic development. The conditions 
that make this growth possible have not existed forever, and it should 
not be assumed that they will remain indefinitely. Meanwhile, a 
significant lag time would necessarily occur before any instrumental 
value, in the form of host-country legal reforms, could be realized-the 
withdrawal of financial support would need to become more 
pronounced, governments would need to acknowledge the withdrawal 
as a consequence of the tolerance of bribery, they would need to enact 
legislation in response, and then enforce it effectively. The conditions 
that make emerging markets unique may or may not last long enough 
for these reforms to occur, and the opportunity for extraordinary 
development would be lost. If these market conditions did remain, the 
years that had passed in the interim would nonetheless mark a lost 
opportunity for growth. That is, even tf the sanctions ultimately worked 
222. See, e.g., M. Shahid Alam, Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political 
Economy of Underdevelopment, 48 AM. J. EcoN. & Soc'¥ 441,448-53 (1989); Mark B. Bader 
& Bill Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 
627, 627 (1983); Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-Corruption 
Efforts: Cu"ent Legal Obstacles and Uncertainties, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 315, 345--47 
(2004); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Commercial Bribery and the Sherman Act: The Case for Per Se 
Illegality, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 365, 390--91 (1987); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 
Q.J. EcoN. 681, 705 (1995); Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the 
World Trade Organization, 28 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 305, 309 (1997), Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, 
Corruption-A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. 
INT'LL. 451,460--61 (1997). 
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in promoting economic growth, people would still suffer. 
The second problem with the economic justification is that 
incremental reductions in bribery will not necessarily improve 
economic growth. At a theoretical level, bribery impedes efficiency, and 
the absolute elimination of bribery would of course improve efficiency. 
But because sanctions could not completely eliminate bribery, the 
question becomes whether the reduction in bribery will lead to an 
increase in efficiency, and that answer is regrettably complex. Political 
scientists such as Samuel Huntington223 and Mancur Olson224 have 
famously observed that in transitional economies, where bureaucratic 
processes are particularly inefficient, bribery may actually allow a 
bypass of the inefficiency. By this ironic reasoning, in countries with 
inefficient bureaucracies bribery is necessary to the efficient conduct of 
business. While counterintuitive and just barely palatable, this theory 
must remain on the table in discussing the impact of anti-bribery 
enforcement on the economic development of emerging markets. 
Alternatively, we might prefer to rely on a deontological 
justification-one that is ethical rather than economic. The 
deontological theory holds that bribery is absolutely wrong and 
therefore should be sanctioned regardless of its economic impact.~25 By 
this thinking, no amount of economic development could justify the 
tolerance of, or participation in, the unethical practice of bribing 
overseas government officials. If one begins from the premise that 
bribery is an absolute wrong, the only appropriate response is to work 
towards reducing it. The problem with this justification, however, is 
even more fundamental: there is simply no evidence that Congress, or 
any other deliberative body for that matter, has ever adopted this policy. 
As the legislative history shows, whether bribery is an absolute and 
universal moral wrong, which government should seek to immediately 
eradicate regardless of the economic implications, was heavily disputed 
in Congress. Unless and until politically accountable bodies adopt this 
principle, it should not be used to justify the enforcement of a statute 
where fines have exceeded $1 billion for a single company. 226 
223. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, PoLmCAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 68--69 (1968). 
224. MANCUR OLSON, JR., POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND 
CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 106--07 (2000). 
225. The deontological approach to law has recently appeared in various legal debates. See, 
e.g., Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance 
Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U.L. REv. 701 (2008) 
(discussing corporate governance); Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally 
Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REv. 751 (2004) 
(discussing capital punishment); Robert Weisberg, The Utilitarian and Deontological 
Entanglement of Debating Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 71 U. Cm. L. REv. 333 
(2004) (discussing gun control). 
226. The total fines levied against Siemens A.G. by the United States and German 
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C. Proposed Reforms: Deterring Bribery Without Deterring 
Investment 
401 
This discussion of the uncertain justification for the present 
enforcement regime is obviously meant to sound a note of caution. Still, 
it must be emphasized that concern for tempering the sanction-like 
effects of anti-bribery legislation does not, by any means, imply an 
abandonment of the commitment to combating bribery. The purpose of 
any changes in the drafting or enforcement of anti-bribery legislation 
should have a very specific and limited purpose: the legislation should 
create a disincentive to bribe but not a disincentive to invest. Put 
another way, while it is good to deter bribery, it is far better to deter 
bribery that occurs in the course of ongoing business activity. 
Promoting ethical business in emerging markets is precisely the purpose 
of the FCP A. 227 
There are numerous reforms to the text and enforcement of anti-
bribery legislation that would advance the policy of reducing bribery 
without scaring companies away from emerging markets. The first and 
most obvious is to bring the remainder of the capital-rich countries into 
the OECD Convention. The black knight effect occurs because capital-
rich countries with substantial FDI capacity, but that are not subject to 
anti-bribery legislation, still exist, just as they did prior to enactment of 
the OECD Convention. The playing field remains uneven. Most 
notably, of the four lar§est emerging markets-Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China (the BRICsi 8-Brazil is the only one to have adopted the 
Convention.229 The OECD is presently engaged in negotiations with the 
authorities exceeded this amount. For the DOJ press release, see Press Release, Department of 
Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-ll05.html [hereinafter DOJ 
Press Release]. 
227. For further commentary on the role of private investment in curbing bribery, see, for 
example, Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector Is Likely to Lead the Next 
Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 45, 47--48 (2006); Paul 
D. Carrington, Law and Transnational Corruption: The Need for Lincoln's Law Abroad, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2007, at 109, 136-38; Roger C. Cramton, Counseling 
Organizational Clients "Within the Bounds of the Law," 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1043, 1058 
(2006); Jose Armando Fanjul, Comment, Corporate Corruption in Latin America: Acceptance, 
Bribery, Compliance, Denial, Economics, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 26 PENN ST. 
INT'L L. REv. 735, 758 (2008). 
228. Goldman Sachs first coined the acronym "BRIC" in 2001 to describe the four 
emerging markets that, by 2050, could replace most of the current G6 members in terms of 
GDP. See Goldman Sachs, http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideaslbrics/index.html (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2009). 
229. OECD Convention, supra note 5. For the list of countries that have adopted the 
Convention, see Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/44/0,3343,en_ 2649 _ 34859 _36433004 _l_l_l_l ,OO.html (last 
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remaining three, finding varying degrees of success. Mere adoption of 
the Convention, of course, is not enough, and the countries must 
meaningfully enforce it. While the day when China, Russia, and India 
demonstrate a resolve to eradicating bribery that is commensurate to the 
more developed nations may not be imminent, it is clearly the first and 
most important piece of a long-term anti-bribery agenda. 
A complementary piece to pursue concurrently is the broad 
implementation and enforcement of demand-side anti-bribery laws. 
Several conventions currently exist, at least on paper, that go beyond the 
supply-side legislation of the FCP A and OECD and prohibit the 
solicitation or receipt of bribes. Some have been ratified by the member 
nations of important emerging market governmental organizations, 
including the Organization of American States' Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption,230 and the African Union's Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 231 More generally, in 2004 
the United Nations passed the Convention Against Corruption,232 which 
requires each member state to adopt legislation criminalizing not only 
the offer of a bribe but also its solicitation or acceptance. Similarly, 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank233 and the 
IMF234 have adopted guidelines that deny funding to governments 
whose officials have solicited or accepted bribes. Less formally, the 
International Chamber of Commerce has adopted rules addressing the 
demand of bribes and has urged businesses around the world to 
implement them.235 To the extent that these conventions and guidelines 
are adopted and enforced, companies will be less fearful of doing 
visited Oct. 7, 2009). 
230. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, art. VI(l)(a), Mar. 29, 1996, 35 
I.L.M. 724, 729 (1996); see Lucinda A. Low et al., The Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption: A Comparison with the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 243, 244-45 (1998). 
231. African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, arts. 4(1 )(b), 
11(3), http://www.africa-union.org/root/au!Documentsffreatiesffext/Convention%20on%20Co 
mbating%20Corruption. pdf. 
232. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, arts. 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/58/4 (Oct. 
31, 2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004). For a more thorough discussion ofthe convention's 
history and substance, see Weiss, supra note 3, at 480-81. 
233. See POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, THE WORLD BANK, HELPING 
COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK 23-27 (1997), 
www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corruptn.pdf. 
234. News Brief No. 97115, International Monetary Fund, IMF Adopts Guidelines 
Regarding Governance Issues 'I) 16 (Aug. 4, 1997), available at www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb 
I 1997 /nb9715.htm. 
235. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMBATING EXTORTION AND BRIBERY, ICC 
RULES OF CONDUCT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2005), http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/IC 
C/policy/anticorruption/statements!ICC _Rules_ of_ Conduct_ and_ Recommendations%20 _ 2005 
%20Revision.pdf. 
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business in the previously higher-risk emerging markets. 
The demonstrated sanctions-like effect of the FCPA further suggests 
that the calculation of corporate criminal penalties bears reexamination. 
The FCP A provides that a corporation may be fined the feater of twice 
the gross gain or loss that resulted from the bribery,23 and in recent 
cases, this formula has resulted in staggering penalties.237 Factoring the 
sanctions-like impact of these penalties into the equation might yield 
figures that still punish companies for wrongdoing but do not scare 
them away from foreign emerging markets that badly need their 
capital.238 
More fundamentally, we should reevaluate the underlying theories of 
liability by which the government holds corporations accountable for 
FCP A violations. Indeed, one commentator has observed that "nothing 
magnifies the impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on 
corporations more than respondeat superior," the common law doctrine 
by which employers are held liable for the conduct of their 
employees.239 As the U.S. Sentencing Commission explained, 
Criminal liability can attach to an organization whenever an 
employee of the organization commits an act within the 
apparent scope of his or her employment, even if the 
employee acted directly contrary to company policy and 
instructions. An entire organization, despite its best efforts 
to prevent wrongdoing in its ranks, can still be held 
criminally liable for any of its employees' illegal actions?40 
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78ffl:c)(2)(A)-(B) (2006); id. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A)-(B). Subject to this 
maximum, the amount of the fine is governed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B4.1 (2008); see ZARIN, supra note 18, at 8-4. 
Additionally, engaging in an act of bribery can result in the suspension or debarment of a 
contractor or subcontractor from continuing to do business with the U.S. Government pursuant 
to the Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. Ch. 1 (2008), and an indictment or conviction 
under the FCP A can adversely impact an application for a license to export defense-related 
articles or services pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (Supp. 2006). !d. 
23 7. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 226; Press Release, Department of Justice, Kellogg 
Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million 
Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminaUpr/press _releases/200 
9/02/02-11-09kellogg-guilty.pdf. 
238. For commentary on the impact of the FCPA on international business, see, for 
example, H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government's Campaign 
Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 407, 430 (1999); EllenS. 
Podgor, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. 
REv. 325, 330 (1997); Ashe, supra note 24, at 2904. 
239. The FCPA Blog: News and Views about the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, In the Master's Defense http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/11/24/in-the-masters-
defense.htrnl (Nov. 24, 2008, 08:22 Esn. 
240. PAOLA DESIO, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF TIIE ORGANIZATIONAL 
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It is easy to imagine the impact of this doctrine in the FCP A context. 
Defendants are often large publicly-traded companies with ventures in 
various countries and various cultures. In some of these countries, 
bribery has long been regarded as a customary, acceptable, and even 
necessary way of doing business with a government that is likely 
perceived as egregiously inefficient and inherently corrupt. 
Recognizing the risk, a company might implement a broad compliance 
program that includes rigorous anti-bribery training for its employees. 
Nonetheless, if a lower-level employee eager to close a deal pays a 
bribe, the company is criminally liable. Penalizing companies for such 
acts, despite their best preventative efforts, perverts the purposes of the 
FCPA. By penalizing bribery, it creates a risk that large international 
companies feel they cannot afford to take. They financially withdraw 
from higher-risk markets, rather than building alliances with those 
nations in the way that those who testified before Congress anticipated. 
Rather than lending financial and political support to emerging markets, 
the statute may punish the countries in which these companies would 
otherwise invest. 
The outer limits of the doctrine were recently challenged in a Second 
Circuit case.241 Though it concerned environmental rather than anti-
bribery laws, it involved arguments that are at least as applicable to the 
FCP A context. An amicus brief co-authored by the former Enron 
prosecutor, Andrew Weissmann, echoed the admonition of the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission and described the dangers of an overly broad 
application of respondeat superior: 
A criminal indictment can be a life-or-death matter 
for a company. Yet, the vast sweep of the district court's 
standard for the imposition of vicarious criminal liability 
makes corporations accountable for almost all criminal 
acts of any low level employees--even those acting 
GUIDELINES 1 (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ORGOVERVIEW.pdt: 
241. United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009). The defendant-
appellant was a company incorporated in Liberia with its principal place of business in Greece, 
and was convicted of violating the Act to Prevent Pollution on Ships for failing to maintain 
appropriate records of its petroleum deliveries while in U.S. waters. !d. at 305. The defendant, 
as well as an amicus, argued that a company should not be held liable under respondeat superior 
unless it "lacked effective policies and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by its 
employees." Jd. at 310. The Second Circuit held that the absence of such policies and 
procedures is not "a separate element," and thus irrelevant to liability under respondeat superior. 
Jd. The Wall Street Journal reported that Judge Calabresi, former Dean of the Yale Law School, 
found amicus' argument in particular "interesting" and that it "appealed" to him as an 
"academic[]," but further stated, "(w]hether we should do something about this as judges is a 
different matter." Posting of Amir Efrati to WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG, 
http:/ /blogs. wsj .com/law/2008/11/21/former-enron-prosecutor-criminal-charges-shouldnt-be-so-
easy/ (Nov. 21,2008, 15:11 EST). 
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against explicit instructions and in the face of the most 
robust corporate compliance program. 242 
405 
The same brief compellingly explained that the doctrine forces 
companies to settle criminal charges and forego the opportunity to 
prove their innocence at trial: 
[Respondeat superior] has caused a tremendous imbalance 
between the power of a prosecutor and a corporate 
defendant. Given the hair-trigger for corporate liability 
even for the most responsible corporate citizen, many 
corporations forego any defenses in order to resolve 
threatened prosecution .... The potential for inappropriate 
prosecutorial pressure is particularly heightened in the area 
of corporate criminal investigations that end in Draconian 
non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, 
where no court has oversight authority. There, the 
prosecutor effectively serves as both judge and jury. 
Because of the disastrous consequences of a corporate 
indictment and the ease with which corporations may be 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
corporations are under immense pressure to agree to almost 
any terms. The vast majority of these negotiations go on 
behind closed doors, with little public scrutiny and no 
judicial review.243 
This precise dynamic can be observed with powerful effect in the 
FCP A context, where companies routinely settle their charges through 
deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements to avoid the 
damaging publicity of a criminal trial.244 
242. Brief for The Association of Corporate Counsel, et al. as Amici Curiae In Support of 
Appellant Urging Reversal at 20,United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(No. 07-5801-CR). 
243. Id. at 20, 22. 
244. For a thorough discussion of the role of respondeat superior in FCPA enforcement, see 
the series of entries at The FCPA Blog: News and Views about the United States Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/tag/respondeat-superior. Dick Cassin, the 
blog author, argues, 
[R]espondeat superior does more harm than good. Sure, it produces a 100% 
corporate 'conviction' rate in FCPA cases, which must go down well at the 
Justice Department. But, it probably doesn't deter illegal behavior or encourage 
better compliance programs. And it puts overwhelming pressure on 
organizations to resolve threatened criminal cases. Because of the catastrophic 
effects of any potential conviction, companies have to settle with the 
government. So they rush into agreements that may require them to waive the 
attorney-client privilege, hand over employees' private documents and data, 
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Although the Second Circuit in United States v. Ionia Mana~ement 
S.A. affirmed the lower court's judgment against the defendant, 45 the 
case further exposes ever-increasing cracks in the respondeat superior 
dam. Scholars have generated a substantial body of research calling for 
a more deliberate application of the doctrine, one that more effectively 
advances the underlying policies of punishment and deterrence.246 One 
remedy, proposed by Professor Ellen Podgor, is to recognize a good 
faith defense for corporations where the violation occurred despite the 
defendant company's best preventative efforts.247 Indeed, such a 
defense would substantially mitigate the sanctioning effect of FCP A 
enforcement, as the risk of doing business in foreign markets would 
significantly decrease. 
VI. CONCLUSION: DESTINED TO REPEAT HISTORY? 
In concluding their comprehensive analysis of the history of 
economic sanctions, HSEO issued a striking admonition, which now 
cut off support for their legal defense, and fire those who don't cooperate with 
government investigations. 
The FCPA Blog: News and Views about the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/1/22/naked-corporate-defendants.html (Jan. 22, 2009, 
08:28 EST), http://fcpablog.blogspot.com/2009/0 I /naked-corporate-defendants.html. He 
concludes that "[i]t is time to fix respondeat superior--either in court or in Congress." /d. at In 
the Master's Defense (Nov. 24, 2008), http://fcpablog.blogspot.com/2008/11/in-masters-
defense.html. 
245. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d at 311. 
246. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 866--67 (1994); Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and 
Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 113 (2007); Kathleen F. Brickey, Rethinking Corporate Liability Under 
the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 63Q-32 (1988); H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious 
Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts ofTheir Employees and Agents, 41 LoY. L. REv. 
279, 327-28 (1995); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate 
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1095, 1182-83 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does 
"Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in 
American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 246 ·(1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No 
Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. 
L. REv. 386,459 (1981); V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The 
Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REv. 355, 412-14 (1999); V.S. Khanna, Corporate 
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1477, 1532-34 (1996); 
Ellen S. Podgor, A New Corporate World Mandates a "Good Faith" Affirmative Defense, 44 
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1537, 1543 (2007); George J. Terwilliger III, Under-Breaded Shrimp and 
Other High-Crimes: Addressing the Over-Criminalization of Commercial Regulation, 44 AM. 
CRIM. L. REv. 1417, 1434 (2007); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance 
Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 605,689 (1995); Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate 
Liability, 821No. L.J. 411, 451 (2007); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating 
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227, 1367-75 (1979). 
247. Podgor, supra note 238, at 1538. 
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applies with equal force to members of the international law 
enforcement community who are poised to greatly increase the 
enforcement of anti-bribery legislation: 
Sender governments should think through their means and 
objectives before taking a final decision to deploy 
sanctions. Leaders in the sender country should be 
confident that their goals are within their reach, that they 
can impose sufficient economic pain to command the 
attention of the target country ... that their efforts will not 
prompt offsetting policies by other powers, and that the 
sanctions chosen will not impose insupportable costs on 
their domestic constituents and foreign allies. These 
propitious conditions arise less often than the leaders of 
major powers seem to imagine. 248 
In relation to the FCPA and the OECD convention, there is 
absolutely no indication that sender governments have adequately 
thought through their means. A public debate about whether to 
withdraw investment from emerging markets in the name of combating 
bribery has simply never occurred. As the above analysis is intended to 
show, overwhelming evidence now exists that such a debate should 
occur, and promptly. This article has proposed several possible 
reforms-expanding the signatories to the OECD convention, 
promoting demand-side legislation, tempering the use of respondeat 
superior-that might effectively implement international anti-bribery 
norms without stymieing economic development. Further public 
discussion on the purpose and effect of anti-bribery legislation would 
likely elicit many others. 
While the goal of reducing bribery is no longer controversial, the 
question of how to do so has thus proven quite complex. Indeed, it has 
become more complex, not less, since 1977. In sum, Senator Proxmire's 
original introduction to the congressional inquiry into the need for anti-
bribery legislation is even more appropriate today than it was then: 
"Virtually every [one] ... thinks bribery is a dreadful thing. There is no 
dispute about that. The question ... is the remedy."249 
248. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 17, at 178. 
249. 1976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 133, at 75 (statement of Sen. William 
Proxmire). 
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VII. APPENDIX: CATEGORIZING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY MARKET 
TYPE 
This appendix briefly defines the several market types used in this 
study, and explains how the countries in which FCP A violations have 
occurred are categorized into those types. A spreadsheet follows that 
shows, for each FCP A enforcement action, the country or countries in 
which the violation occurred, the Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index ranking of each country, and its market type as 
defined by S&P. 
There is almost no legal scholarship identifying the distinctive legal 
features of emerging markets. Despite the term's wide usage today and 
the general recognition that law and politics figure prominently in the 
development of emerging markets, legal scholars lag well behind the 
community of legal and fmancial practitioners in understanding this 
phenomenon. A useful general characterization of emerging markets-
and to this author's knowledge, the only available defmition in the law 
review literature, though written by a World Bank economist rather than 
a lawyer--explains that emerging markets are principally distinguished 
by two characteristics: volatility and transition.250 They are volatile in 
several related respects: the value of financial assets and volume of 
financial output vary dramatically; they are subject to price shocks; 
domestic policy is comparatively unstable; government regulation and 
intervention tends to be "pro-cyclical," meaning that it tends to 
exacerbate both booms and recessions; and investors often perceive 
policymaking as arbitrary.251 Emerging markets tend to be transitional 
in the sense that they have recently moved to a market economy from a 
planned economy; both their economic and political institutions are 
changing dramatically; there is a relatively short history of foreign 
investment; they are witnessing a rapid increase in the market's 
participation in the international economy; and they generally are 
experiencing dramatic changes in such demogaphic factors as fertility 
rates, life expectancy, and educational status. 2 
Frontier markets, by comparison, might be thought of as nascent 
emerging markets (a nearly redundant phrase, but still illustrative). They 
exhibit the same characteristics as emerging markets, but to a different 
degree: they are not quite as far along in their transition, and are 
somewhat more volatile. Owing to the relative newness of the term, 
legal academic defmitions are, perhaps fittingly, less developed than the 
250. Ashoka Mody, What is an Emerging Market?, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 641, 643 (2004). 
251. !d. at 641-45. 
252. !d. at 642, 645. For a more technical description of the financial characteristics of 
emerging markets, see Wei Li & Richard Hoyer-Ellefsen, Characteristics of Emerging Markets 
(Oct. 21, 2008), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909890. 
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term emerging markets, and this author could locate none. One 
investment company provides a very simple and useful definition: 
frontier markets "demonstrate a relative openness and accessibility for 
foreign investors" and are not "undergoing a period of extreme 
economic and political instability. "253 Emerging markets and frontier 
markets, then, are different in degree but similar in kind. For this 
reason, they are combined into a single category of emerging markets 
for purpose of this Article, although the following spreadsheet preserves 
the distinction. 
While various investment firms have provided slightly differing lists 
of emerging markets, 254 this Article will rely on the categories created 
by S&P. A combination of its indices of emerging markets and frontier 
markets yields the following list: Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote 
d'Ivorie, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United 
Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 255 Countries that are more 
developed than the above are here referred to as "developed" in the 
spreadsheet and countries that are less developed are called "less 
developed." 
Calculating the number of alleged violations that have occurred in 
these countries, for the specific purpose of identifying the patterns 
among various types of markets, requires a number of methodological 
253. Product Insights, MSCI Barra, MSCI Frontier Market Indices 2 (Dec. 18, 2007), 
available at http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/fm/MSCI _Frontier_ Markets. pdf. 
254. See, e.g., FTSE, FTSE Global Equity Index Series Country Classification 2 (2009), 
http://ftse.com/lndices/Country _ Classification/Downloads/FTSE _Country_ Classification_ Sept_ 
09_update.pdf; MSCI Barra, MSCI Blobal Investable Market Indices Methodology 57 (2009), 
http://www.mscibarra.com/eqb/methodology/meth _ docs/MSCI _ Aug09 _ GIMIMethod.pdf. 
255. See Standard & Poor's, The S&P Emerging Markets Database Brochure, available at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdflindexlbrochure _ EMDB.pdf. (Standard & Poor's, 
S&PIIFCG Extended Frontier 150, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/inde 
x/SP _IFCG_Extended_Frontier_150_Factsheet.pdf. The purpose of this analysis is to anticipate 
the effect of FCP A enforcement patterns on contemporary investment decisions. Accordingly, 
countries in which FCPA violations have historically occurred are categorized based on S&P's 
contemporary market" definitions-for instance, a country in which a violation occurred in 1985 
may be categorized, for purposes of this analysis, as an emerging market based on its 2008 
market conditions, rather than its 1985 conditions. A decision to invest in a particular country 
will of course be based on contemporary market conditions, but the impact of FCP A 
enforcement patterns on that decision will be based, afleast in part, on where the violations have 
historically occurred. 
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decisions. Where a single case involved bribery in multiple countries, 
each country is counted once. If there were multiple cases concerning 
the same set of transactions-for instance, separate criminal actions 
against multiple defendants or overlapping DOJ and SEC cases-each 
country in which bribery occurred is counted only once. Where two 
unrelated cases involved bribery in the same country, that country is 
counted twice. This list does not include countries in which transactions 
were suspected to have occurred but which were not part of the 
underlying facts of the conviction or settlement. Finally, two older cases 
that involved an extraordinarily high number of countries256 were not 
included in the tally because they would disproportionately influence 
the numbers. Otherwise, this index includes every alleged violation that 
resulted in a finding of liability, a conviction, or a settlement, between 
the original passage of the FCP A and October of 2008. 
The totals, as indicated in the spreadsheet below, are as follows. 
There have been 125 "violations" of the FCPA from its ratification to 
October of 2008. Of those, thirty-three occurred in less developed 
markets, six occurred in frontier markets, seventy-seven occurred in 
emerging markets, and nine occurred in developed markets. The Article 
combines frontier and emerging markets, to produce a total of eighty-
three violations in that market type. 
256. SEC v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), 
96,922 (D.D.C. 1979); SEC v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH), 97,699 (D.D.C. 1980). 
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S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location ~e Rating (2008) 
United States v. Albert 
Jackson Stanley, 08-CR-
2008 597 (S.D. Tex. 2008) Nigeria Emerging 121 
United States v. Faro 
2008 Technologies Inc. (2008) China Emerging 72 
United States v. AGA 
Med. Corp., 08-CR-
2008 00172-1 (D. Minn. 2008) China Emerging 72 
United States v. Willbros 
Group, Inc. 08-CR-0287 
(S.D. Tex. 2008); United 
States v. Steph, 4:07-CR-
00307 (S.D. Tex. 2007); 
SEC v. Brown, 4:06-CV-
02919 (S.D. Tex. 2006); 
United States v. Brown, 
2008 4:06-CR-00316 (2006) Nigeria Emerging 121 
United States v. Willbros 
Group, Inc., 08-CR-0287 
(S.D. Tex. 2008); United 
States v. Steph, 4:07-CR-
00307 (S.D. Tex. 2007); 
SEC v. Brown, 4:06-CV-
02919 (S.D. Tex. 2006); 
United States v. Brown, 
2008 4:06-CR-00316 (2006) Ecuador Frontier 151 
United States v. Willbros 
Group, Inc., 08-CR-0287 
(S.D. Tex. 2008); United 
States v. Steph, 4:07-CR-
00307 (S.D. Tex. 2007); 
SEC v. Brown, 4:06-CV-
02919 (S.D. Tex. 2006); 
United States v. Brown, Less 
2008 4:06-CR-00316 (2006) Bolivia Developed 102 
United States v. Self, 
8:08-CR-00110 (S.D. Cal. 
2008 2008) UK Developed 16 
412 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Ratin2 (2008) 
United States v. AB 
Volvo (2008); United 
States v. Volvo Constr. 
Equip. AB, 1 :08-CR-
00069 (D.D.C. 2008); 
United States v. Renault 
Trucks SAS, 1:08-CR- Less 
2008 00069 (D.D.C. 2008) Iraq Developed 178 
United States v. 
Flowserve Corp. (2008); 
United States v. 
Flowserve Pompes SAS, 
I :08-CR-00035 (D.D.C. Less 
2008 2008) Iraq Developed 178 
United States v. 
Westinghouse Air Brake 
2008 Tech. Corp. (2008) India Emerging 85 
SEC v. Con-Way Inc., 
1:08-CV-01478 (D.D.C. 
2008 2008) Philippines Emerging 141 
United States v. Smith, 
8:07-CR-00069 (C.D. 
2007 Cal. 2007) UK Developed 16 
United States v. Akzo 
Nobel, N.V. (2007); SEC 
v. Azko Nobel, N.V., No. 
07-CV-02293 (D.D.C. Less 
2007 2007) Iraq Developed 178 
United States v. Chevron 
Corp. (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
SEC v. Chevron Corp., 
No. 07-CIV 10299 Less 
2007 I(S.D.N.Y. 2007) Iraq Developed 178 
United States v. Lucent 
Tech. (2007); SEC v. 
Lucent Technologies Inc., 
No. 07-CV-02301 
2007 I(D.D.C. 2007) China Emerging 72 
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S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (2008) 
United States v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co. (2007); United 
States v. Ingersoll-Rand 
Italiana SpA, 1:07-CR-
00294 (D.D.C. 2007); 
United States v. Thermo 
King Ireland Ltd., 1:07-
CR-00296 (D.D.C. 2007); 
SEC v. Ingersoll-Rand 
Co., No. 07-CV-1955 Less 
2007 I(D.D.C. 2007) Iraq Developed 178 
United States v. York 
Int'l Corp. (2007); SEC v. 
York Int'l Corp., No. 07- Less 
2007 CV -1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Iraq Developed 178 
United States v. York 
Int'l Corp. (2007); SEC v. 
York Int'l Corp., No. 07-
2007 CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Bahrain Emerging 43 
United States v. York 
Int'l Corp. (2007); SEC v. 
York Int'l Corp., No. 07-
2007 CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Egypt Emerging 115 
United States v. York 
Int'l Corp. (2007); SEC v. 
York Int'l Corp., No. 07-
2007 CV -1750 (D.D.C. 2007) India Emerging 85 
United States v. York 
Int'l Corp. (2007); SEC v. 
York Int'l Corp., No. 07-
2007 CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) China Emerging 72 
United States v. York 
Int'l Corp. (2007); SEC v. 
York Int'l Corp., No. 07-
2007 CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Nigeria Emerging 121 
United States v. York 
lnt'l Corp. (2007); SEC v. 
York Int'l Corp., No. 07-
2007 CV -1750 (D.D.C. 2007) Turkey Emerging 58 
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S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (2008) 
United States v. York 
lnt'l Corp. (2007); SEC v. 
York Int'l Corp., No. 07-
2007 CV-1750 (D.D.C. 2007) UAE Emerging 35 
United States v. Paradigm 
2007 B.V. (2007) China Emerging 72 
United States v. Paradigm 
2007 B.V. (2007) Indonesia Emerging 126 
United States v. Paradigm 
2007 B.V. (2007) Kazakhstan Emerging 145 
United States v. Paradigm 
2007 B.V. (2007) Mexico Emerging 72 
United States v. Paradigm 
2007 B.V. (2007) Nigeria Emerging 121 
United States v. Textron, 
Inc. (2007); SEC v. 
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV- Less 
2007 01505 (D.D.C. 2007) Iraq Developed 178 
United States v. Textron, 
Inc. (2007); SEC v. 
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV-
2007 01505(D.D.C.2007) UAE Emerging 35 
United States v. Textron, 
Inc. (2007); SEC v. 
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV-
2007 01505 (D.D.C. 2007) Bangladesh Frontier 147 
United States v. Textron, 
Inc. (2007); SEC v. 
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV-
2007 01505 (D.D.C. 2007) Indonesia Emerging 126 
United States v. Textron, 
Inc. (2007); SEC v. 
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV-
2007 01505 (D.D.C. 2007) Egypt Emerging 115 
United States v. Textron, 
Inc. (2007); SEC v. 
Textron, Inc., No. 07-CV-
2007 01505 (D.D.C. 2007) India Emerging 85 
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S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (2008) 
United States v. Ott, 07-
CR-608 (D.N.J. 2007); 
United States v. Young, 
07-CR-609 (D.N.J. 2007); 
United States v. Amoako, 
3:05-01122 (D.N.J. 
2005); SEC v. Amoako, 
3:05-MJ-01122 (D.N.J. 
2005); SEC v. Ott, 3:06-
2007 CV-04195 (D.N.J. 2006) Nigeria Emerging 121 
United States v. Ott, 07-
CR-608 (D.N.J. 2007); 
United States v. Young, 
07-CR-609 (D.N.J. 2007); 
United States v. Amoako, 
3:05-01122 (D.N.J. 
2005); SEC v. Amoako, 
3:05-MJ-01122 (D.N.J. 
2005); SEC v. Ott, 3:06- Less 
2007 CV-04195 (D.N.J. 2006) Rwanda Developed 102 
United States v. Ott, 07-
CR-608 (D.N.J. 2007); 
United States v. Young, 
07-CR-609 (D.N.J. 2007); 
United States v. Amoako, 
3:05-01122 (D.N.J. 
2005); SEC v. Amoako, 
3:05-MJ-01122 (D.N.J. 
2005); SEC v. Ott, 3:06- Less 
2007 CV-04195 (D.N.J. 2006) Senegal Developed 85 
416 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (2008) 
United States v. Wooh, 
07-CR-244 (D. Or. 2007); 
SEC v. Wooh, 07-CV-95, 
(D. Or. 2007); United 
States v. SSI Int'l Far 
East, Ltd., CR 06-398 (D. 
Or. 2006); United States 
v. Schnitzer Steel Indus. 
(Ind. 2006); In re 
Schnitzer Steel Indus., 
Inc. , SEC Admin Proc. 
2007 File No. 3-12456 (2006) China Emerging 72 
United States v. Wooh, 
07-CR-244 (D. Or. 2007); 
SEC v. Wooh, 07-CV-95~ 
(D. Or. 2007); United 
States v. SSI lnt'l Far 
East, Ltd., CR 06-398 (D. 
Or. 2006); United States 
v. Schnitzer Steel Indus. 
(Ind. 2006); In re 
Schnitzer Steel Indus., 
Inc. , SEC Admin Proc. 
2007 File No. 3-12456 (2006) South Korea Emerging 40 
United States v. Baker 
Hughes Servs. Int'l, Inc., 
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); United States v. 
Baker Hughes, Inc., 
(2007); SEC v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408 
2007 (S.D. Tex. 2007) Kazakhstan Emerging 145 
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United States v. Baker 
Hughes Servs. Int'l, Inc., 
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); United States v. 
Baker Hughes, Inc., 
(2007); SEC v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408 Less 
2007 I(S.D. Tex. 2007) Angola Develop_ed 158 
United States v. Baker 
Hughes Servs. Int'1, Inc. 
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); United States v. 
Baker Hughes, Inc., 
(2007); SEC v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408 
2007 (S.D. Tex. 2007) Nigeria Emerging 121 
United States v. Baker 
Hughes Servs. Int'l, Inc. 
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); United States v. 
Baker Hughes, Inc., 
(2007); SEC v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408 
2007 (S.D. Tex. 2007) Indonesia Emerging 126 
United States v. Baker 
Hughes Servs. Int'l, Inc. 
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); United States v. 
Baker Hughes, Inc., 
(2007); SEC v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408 
2007 (S.D. Tex. 2007) Russia Emerging 147 
418 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location T_Jpe Rating (2008) 
United States v. Baker 
Hughes Servs. Int'l, Inc. 
H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); United States v. 
Baker Hughes, Inc., 
(2007); SEC v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., H-07-1408 Less 
2007 (S.D. Tex. 2007) Uzbekistan Developed 166 
United States v. Vetco 
Gray Controls Ltd., 4:07-
CR-00004 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); United States v. 
Aibel Group Ltd., 4:07-
CR-00005 (S.D. Tex. 
2007); SEC v. John 
Samson, 1 : 06-CV -0 121 7 
2007 lrD.D.C. 2006) Nigeria Emerging 121 
SEC v. Fu, No. 07-CV-
2007 01735(D.D.C.2007) Taiwan Emerging 39 
In re Bristow Group Inc., 
SEC Admin. Proceeding 
2007 (File No. 3-12833) Nigeria Emerging 121 
SEC v. Srinivasan, 07-
CV-1699 (D.D.C. 2007); 
In re Electronic Data Sys. 
Corp., SEC Admin. 
Proceeding File No. 3-
12825 (Sept. 25, 2007) 
2007 (EDS/Keamey) India Emerging 85 
SEC v. Delta & Pine 
Land Co., 07-CV-1352 
(D.D.C. 2007); In re 
Delta & Pine Land Co., 
SEC Admin Proceeding 
2007 File No. 3-12712 (2007) Turkey_ Emerging 58 
SEC v. Dow Chern. Co., 
07-CV-00336 (D.D.C. 
2007 2007) India Emerging 85 
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SEC v_ El Paso Corp, 07-
CV-00899 (S.D.N.Y. Less 
2007 2007) Iraq Developed 178 
SEC v. Tyco Int'l Ltd., 
06-CV-2942 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006 2006) Brazil Emerging 80 
SEC v. Tyco Int'l Ltd., 
06-CV-2942 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006 2006) South Korea Emerging 40 
In re Oil States Int'l, SEC 
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-
2006 12280 (2006) Venezuela Emerging 158 
United States v. 
Sapsizian, 1 :06-CR- Less 
2006 20797 (S.D. Fla. 2006) Costa Rica Developed 47 
United States v. SSI Int'l 
Far East, Ltd:, CR 06-398 
(D. Or. 2006); United 
States v. Schnitzer Steel 
Indus. (Ind. 2006); In re 
Schnitzer Steel Indus., 
Inc., SEC Admin Proc. 
2006 File No. 3-12456 (2006) South Korea Emerging 40 
United States v. Statoil 
ASA, 06-CR-00960 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re 
Statoil ASA, SEC Admin. 
Proc. File No. 3-12453 Less 
2006 (2006) Iran Developed 141 
United States v. Head, 06 
CR-01380 (S.D. Cal. Less 
2006 2006) Benin Developed 96 
United States v. Novak, 
05-180-3 (E.D. Wash. Less 
2006 2006) Liberia Developed 138 
United States v. Salam, 
06-CR-00157 (D.D.C. Less 
2006 2006) Iraq Developed 178 
420 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol.62 
S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (200~-
United States v. Kozeny, 
CR 05-518 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005); United States v. 
Bodmer, CR-03-947 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); United 
States v. Omega 
Advisors, Inc. (2007); 
United States v. Lewis, 
CR-03-930 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003); United States v. 
Farrell, CR-03-290 Less 
2005 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) Azerbaijan Developed 158 
United States v. DPC 
(Tianjin) Co. Ltd., CR 05-
482 (C.D. Cal. 2005); In 
re Diagnostic Prods. 
Corp. SEC Admin. Proc. 
2005 File No. 3-11933 (2005) China Emerging 72 
United States v. 
Monsanto Co. (2005); 
SEC v. Monsanto Co., 05 
CV-14 (D.D.C. 2005); 
United States v. Martin, 
07-CV-00434 (D.D.C. 
2005 2007) Indonesia Emerging 126 
United States v. In Vision 
Tech., Inc. (2005); SEC v. 
GE In Vision, Inc., 3:05-
CV-00660 (N.D. Cal. 
(2005); SEC v. Pillor, 
1:06-C-4906 (N.D. Cal. 
2005 2006) Thailand Emerging 80 
United States v. In Vision 
Tech., Inc. (2005); SEC v. 
GE In Vision, Inc., 3:05-
CV-00660 (N.D. Cal. 
(2005); SEC v. Pillor, 
1 :06-C-4906 (N.D. Cal. 
2005 2006) China Emerging 72 
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United States v. In Vision 
Tech., Inc. (2005); SEC v. 
GE In Vision, Inc., 3:05-
CV-00660 (N.D. Cal. 
(2005); SEC v. Pillor, 
1 :06-C-4906 (N.D. Cal. 
2005 2006) Philippines Emerging 141 
United States v. Micrus 
2005 Corp. (2005) France Developed 23 
United States v. Micrus 
2005 Corp. (2005) Turkey Emerging 58 
United States v. Micrus 
2005 Corp. (2005) Spain Developed 28 
United States v. Micrus 
2005 Corp. (2005) Germany Developed 14 
United States v. Titan 
Corp., CR 05-314 (S.D. 
Cal. 2005); SEC v. Titan 
Corp., 05-CV -0411 Less 
2005 i(D.D.C. 2005) Benin Developed 96 
United States v. 
Thompson & Reilly, 
2:04-CR-00240 (N.D. Al. 
2005 2005) Saudi Arabia Emerging 80 
SEC v. Schering-Plough 
2004 CO!]J_. (D.D.C. 2004) Poland Emerging 58 
In re BJ Servs. Co., SEC 
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-
2004 11427 (2004) Argentina Emerging 109 
SEC v. ABB, Ltd. 
2004 I(D.D.C. 2004) Nigeria Emerging 121 
United States v. ABB 
Vetco Gray Inc. (S.D. Less 
2004 Tex.2004) Angola Developed 158 
United States v. ABB 
Vetco Gray Inc. (S.D. 
2004 Tex.2004) Kazakhstan Emerging 145 
422 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (2008) 
United States v. Giffen, 
03-663 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
United States v. Williams, 
03-CR-406 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003 2003) Kazakhstan Emerging 145 
SEC v. BellSouth Corp. 
2002 (N.D. Ga. 2002) Venezuela Emerging 158 
SEC v. BellSouth Corp. Less 
2002 (N.D. Ga. 2002) Nicaragua Developed 158 
United States v. Pitchford 
CR 1:02-00365 (S.D.N.Y. Less 
2002 2002) Turkmenistan Developed 166 
United States v. Syncor 
Taiwan, Inc., CR-02-1244 
(C.D. Cal. 2002); SEC v. 
Syncor Int'l Corp., 02-
2002 2421 (D.D.C. 2002) Taiwan Emerging 39 
United States v. Sengupta 
CR-02-40 (D.D.C. 2002); 
United States v. Basu, 
2002 CR-02-475 (D.D.C. 2002) Kenya Frontier 147 
United States v. Kay, CR-
4-01-914 (S.D. Tex. 
2001); United States v. 
Kay, CR-4-01-914 (S.D. 
Tex. 2002); SEC v. 
Murphy, H-02-2908 (S.D. Less 
2002 Tex. 2002) Haiti Developed 177 
In re Baker Hughes Inc., 
SEC Admin Proc. File 
No. 3-10572 (2001); SEC 
v. KPMG-SSH, 01-3105 
(S.D. Tex. 2001); SEC v. 
Mattson, 01-3106 (S.D. 
2001 Tex. 2001) Indonesia Emerging 126 
2010] ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION 423 
S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (2008) 
In re Chiquita Brands 
Int'l, Inc., SEC Admin 
Proc File NO. 3-10613 
(2001); SEC v. Chiquita 
Brands Int'l, Inc., 1 :01-
2001 CV-02079 (D.D.C. 2001) Colombia Emergjn_g_ 70 
United States v. Halford, 
et al, 01-CR-221 (W.D. 
Mo. 2001 ); United States 
v. Reitz, CR-01-222 
(W.D. Mo. 2001); United 
States v. King, CR-01- Less 
2001 190 (W.D. Mo. 2001) Costa Rica Developed 47 
United States v. Rothrock, 
2001 CR-343 (W.D. Tex. 2001) Russia Emerging 147 
United States v. Cantor, 
CR-01-687 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001); In reAm. Bank 
Note Holographies, Inc., 
SEC Admin Proc File No. 




2001); SEC v. Cantor, 03-
CV-2488 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001 2003) Saudi Arabia Emerging 80 
SEC v. Int'l Bus. Machs. 
Corp., 00-CV-3040 
2000 (D.D.C. 2000) Argentina Emerging 109 
United States v. Metcalf 
& Eddy (99-CV -12566) 
1999 (D. Mass. 1999) E~t Emerging_ 115 
United States v. Int'l 
Material Solutions, CR-3-
99-008 (S.D. Ohio 1999); 
United States v. Control 
Sys. Specialist, CR-3-98-
1999 073 (S.D. Ohio 1998) Brazil Emerging 80 
424 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (2008) 
United States v. 
Tannenbaum, CR-98-784 
1998 I(S.D.N.Y. 1998) Argentina Emerging 109 
United States v. Saybolt 
N. Arner. Inc., CR-98-
10266 (D. Mass. 1998); 
United States v. Mead, 
CR-98-240-01, D.N.J. 
1998 1998) Panama Emerging 85 
SEC v. Triton Energy 
Corp., 1 :97 -CV -00401 
1997 (D.D.C. 1997) Indonesia Emerging 126 
SEC v. Montedison, 
S.P .A., 1 :96-CV -02631 
1996 (D.D.C. 1996) Italy Developed 55 
United States v. Lockheed 
Corp., CR-1-94-22-016 
(N.D. Ga. (1994); United 
States v. Love (N.D. Ga. 
1994); United States v. 
1994 Nassar (N.D. Ga. 1994) Egypt Emerging 115 
United States v. Vitusa 
Corp., CR-94-253 (D.N.J. 
1994); United States v. 
Herzberg, CR-94-254 Dominican Less 
1994 (1994) Republic Developed 102 
United States v. Steindler, 
et al, CR-1-94-29 (S.D. 
1994 Ohio 1994) Israel Emerging 33 
United States v. Am. 
Totalisator Co. (D. Md. 
1993 199n_ Greece Developed 57 
United States v. Domier Less 
1990 GmbH (D. Minn. 19901 Niger Developed 115 
United States v. Harris 
Corp., CR-90-0456 (N.D. 
1990 Cal. 1990) Colombia Emerging 70 
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United States v. FG 
Mason Eng'g, Inc., B-90-
1990 29 (D. Conn. 1990) Germany Developed 14 
United States v. Eagle 
Bus Mfg., B-91-171 (S.D. 
Tex. 1991); United States 
v. Morton, CR-3-90-061 
(N.D. Tex. 1990); United 
States v. Blondek, 3-90-
62 (N.D. Tex. 1990); 
United States v. Castle 
1991 (N.D. Tex. 1990) Canada Developed 9 
United States v. Young & 
Rubicam, Inc., CR-N-89-
68 (D. Conn. 1990); 
Abrahams v. Young & 
Rubicam, Inc. (D. Conn. 
1994 1994) Jamaica Frontier 96 
United States v. Pou Dominican Less 
1989 (S.D. Fla. 1989) Republic Developed 102 
United States v. 
Goodyear, CR-89-0156 Less 
1989 (D.D.C. 1989) Irag Developed 178 
United States v. Napco 
Int'l, Inc. CR-4-89-65 (D. 
Minn. 1989); United 
States v. Liebo, CR-4-89- Niger ( Less 
1991 76 (D. Minn. 1989) Developed 115 
SEC v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 
86-CV-1904 (D.D.C. 
1986); Howes v. Atkins, 
83-CV-279 (E.D. Ky. 
(1987); Williams v. Hall, 
84-CV-149 (E.D. Ky. 
1986 1988) Oman Emerging 41 
United States v. Silicon 
Contractors, CR-85-251 
1985 {E.D. La. 1985) Mexico Emerging 72 
426 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
S&P TI 
Violation Market CPI 
Year Matter(s) Location Type Rating (2008) 
United States v. Carpente1 
& Kirkpatrick, CR-85-
353 (D.N.J. 1985); United 
States v. Carpenter 
1985 (D.N.J. 1985) Nigeria Emerging 121 
United States v. Applied 
Process Prods. Overseas, 
CR-83-00004 (D.D.C. 
1983); United States v. 
Batan, CR-83-00005 
1983 (D.D.C. 1983) Mexico Emerging 72 
SEC v. Sam P. Wallace 
Co.,, 81-CV-1915 
(D.D.C. 1981); United 
States v. Sam P. Wallace 
Co., No. 83-0034 (D.P.R. 
1983); United States v. 
Rodriguez, 83-0044 Trinidad & 
1983 i(D.P.R. 1983) Tobago Frontier 72 
United States v. Int'l 
Harvester, 82-CR-244 
(S.D. Tex. 1982); United 
States v. Crawford 
Enters., CR-82-224 (S.D. 
Tex. 1982); United States 
v. Ruston Gas Turbines, 
CR-82-207 (S.D. Tex. 
1982); United States v. 
C.E. Miller Corp., CR-82-
788 (C.D. Cal. 1982); 
United States v. Marquis 
King, CR-83-00020 
1983 D.D.C. 1983) Mexico Emerging 72 
United States v. Kenny 
Int'l Corp., CR-79-3 Less 
1979 tD.D.C. 1979) Cook Islands Developed n/a 
United States v. Carver, 
1979 i(S.D. Fla. 1979) Qatar Emerging 28 
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SEC v. Katy Indus., 78-
1978 CV-3476 (N.D. Ill. 1978) Indonesia Emerging 126 
SEC v. Page Airways, 
Inc., 78-CV-0645 (D.D.C. Less 
1978 1978) Gabon Developed 96 
SEC v. Page Airways, 
Inc., 78-CV -0645 (D.D.C. 
1978 1978) Malaysia Emerging 47 
SEC v. Page Airways, 
Inc., 78-CV-0645 (D.D.C. 
1978 1978) Ivory Coast Frontier 151 
SEC v. Page Airways, 
Inc., 78-CV -0645 (D.D.C. 
1978 1978) Morocco Emerging 80 
SEC v. Page Airways, 
Inc., 78-CV -0645 (D.D.C. 
1978 1978) Saudi Arabia Emerging 80 
SEC v. Page Airways, 
Inc., 78-CV -0645 (D.D.C. Less 
1978 1978) Uganda Developed 126 
